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ABSTRACT
Piracy at sea has been a threat which has plagued the mariner since the
earliest trading vessels took to the sea more than two thousand years ago. To
those outside of the maritime community, the notion of piracy likely conjures
up visions of Captain Kidd and Blackbeard, the sort of lifestyle, popularized
in the Errol Flynn movies of the 1930s, which has long since passed into
history. In reality, violence and robbery at sea is alive and well in certain
geographic locations around the globe. In the past decade, the problem of
piratic attack upon merchant vessels has become especially acute in the
Singapore Strait, one of the world's most important commercial and strategic
waterways. Today's conventional international law of piracy provides for
universal jurisdiction over piracy which occurs on the "high seas." The
conventional law of piracy is largely the product of customary and municipal
concepts of the crime, jurisdiction, and international relations which existed
in the eighteenth century. However other aspects of the law of the sea have
gradually evolved in response to changing international political and economic
notions. New concepts such as the introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zone,
expanded territorial seas, and archipelagic waters, have effectively reduced
the areal extent of the "high seas," and consequently, have rendered the
existing conventional law of piracy inadequate to respond to most of the
piratic activity which is occurring in the world today.
This paper examines the development of the international law of piracy, and
the effect that contemporary notions of the law of the sea and international
relations have on the existing conventional law. The terrorist attack on the
cruise ship Achille Lauro is cited as an example of the shortcomings of the
existing conventional law's definition of the offense of piracy in the modern
age. The present situation in the Singapore Strait is cited as an example of
how contemporary notions of littoral state sovereignty militate against an
effective international response to "traditional" piratic activity occurring
in an international strait. Recommendations for improving the international
community'S ability to address the problems posed by contemporary piracy and
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION
The maritime world is fraught with hazards. Since the inception of
navigation, nature has pitched an unrelenting assault on the mariner. It has
imperiled him with violent storms and waves, frustrated him with tricky
currents and unfavorable winds, and impaled him on hidden rocks and shoals,
forcing him always to adapt to its fickle and dangerous moods. Over time, the
maritime community has responded to nature's challenges through advancing
technology, both in the design and construction of vessels, and in the art and
science of navigation.
The forces of nature are not the only hazards in the maritime world. Piracy
at sea has been a threat which has plagued the mariner since the earliest
trading vessels took to the sea more than two thousand years ago. Mentioning
the term "piracy" today, particularly to those outside of the maritime
community, is likely to conjure up vivid images of swashbucklers and
buccaneers, Captain Kidd, Blackheard, and treasures of the spanish Main.
Indeed, these concepts, embellished in legend and literature, now provide the
popular romanticized perception of piracy typified by the Errol Flynn films of
the 1930s, i.e., private individuals loyal to no state cruising the high seas
and attacking indiscriminately in a career of robbery and violence.
Precisely because of this romanticized vision of outlaw brigands plundering
on the high seas, there has been a general feeling that maritime piracy has
passed into history, and is no longer a part of the modern world. One might
speculate that many aspects of modern civilization have, over time, severely
impacted upon the practice of piracy. There are today of course far fewer
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uninhabited regions which could serve as hideouts for pirates. Other
contemporary developments such as satellite links which provide instantaneous
telecommunications capability between ship and shore, modern navies and coast
guards, and the size and speed of modern merchant vessels, would all seemingly
conspire against the practice of piracy today.
THE CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE OF PIRACY
In fact however, the "traditional" form of piracy, robbery and violence
against merchant vessels at sea is alive and well in specific geographic
regions of the globe. In the past ten years, piratic attacks have been
reported off the coasts of West Africa, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. In the
South China Sea, which has historically been a hotbed of piracy, piratic
activity is especially prevalent today in the vicinity of the Anambas,
Natunas, and Spratly Islands, as well as in the vicinity of the Philippines.
Many of the most notorious pirate attacks have occurred within the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore. Much as in the past, geography and economics have
combined to make piracy an attractive occupation in these regions; the heavily
vegetated shorelines and small islands in these areas provide ample cover for
attack, and the subsistence level economies of these Third World regions makes
the practice of piracy financially rewarding.•
In addition to the "traditional" form of piracy which is still occurring,
there has been another "piratic" threat to the maritime community which has
resurfaced in a contemporary context: the concept of maritime terrorism, or
politically motivated piracy. The October 1985 terrorist attack on the
Italian cruise liner the Achille Lauro, which resulted in the murder of an
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American citizen, received global attention and provided a chilling example of
this phenomenon. In contrast to "traditional" piracy which is motivated
largely by a desire for private economic gain, maritime terrorists embrace the
disruption of international shipping as an effective tactic by which to
further their particular public or political objectives. Regardless of the
specific goals, the presence of the maritime terrorist poses as much danger to
the maritime community as does the contemporary "traditional" pirate.
THE CRIME OF PIRACY AND THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF "HIGH SEAS"
As the maritime community has evolved through the ages and developed
technology to respond to the natural hazards to navigation, so has it
concurrently developed jurisprudential concepts to define the elements of the
offense of piracy, and applied enforcement mechanisms to repress the crime of
piracy at sea. The cornerstone of the international law of piracy has been the
"high seas" element of the offense, which provides the basis for universal
jurisdiction over piracy.
However, the law of the sea has gradually evolved in response to changing
international political and economic notions. New concepts, particularly the
introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the sea,l and its resultant treaty (hereinafter 1982
Law of the Sea Convention) have had a profound impact on the areal extent of
application of the international law of piracy, which has remained essentially
unchanged since the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High seas2 (hereinafter
High Seas Convention). Specifically, Article 86 of Part VII of the 1982 Law
of the Sea Convention, which defines the applicability of the High Seas
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provisions of the Convention, states that the High Seas provisions apply only
to those parts of the sea which are not included in the EEZ, territorial sea,
internal waters, or archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state. Because the
piracy provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention are located within
Part VII, arguably, they would not apply in the EEZ. However, the matter is
rendered ambiguous by the clause in Article 58 of Part V of the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention which holds, in relevant part, that the High Seas articles
(Articles 88-115) and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the
EEZ in so far as they are not incompatible with Part V.
As the sovereignty and sovereign rights of littoral states have grown over
the past several decades, ocean regions formerly considered the "high seas"
have been eliminated. Thus, although contemporary piracy can often be every
bit as violent and ruthless as the plunderings of yesteryear, the important
factor distinguishing contemporary piratic attacks from their historical
antecedents is the absence of the "high seas" element of the offense. Piratic
activity which physically occurred on what was once the "high seas" and thus,
according to customary and conventional international law would have been
within the jurisdiction of any powerful state to repress, now falls within the
enforcement jurisdiction of various littoral states, which may not have the
requisite economic or technical resources to deal effectively with the
problem.
THE PROBLEM OF PIRACY REPRESSION UNDER THE COHVEHTIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
Today's "traditional" form of piracy, as well as the emerging problem of
maritime terrorism, present difficult enforcement challenges to a conventional
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international piracy doctrine which traces its genesis to an era when piracy
repression was unencumbexed by such modern developments as expanded
territorial seas, archipelagic waters, EEZs, open registry shipping, and post-
colonial sensitivities regarding national sovereignty which have arisen under
the guise of the new international economic order. The definition of piracy
provided in the existing High Seas Convention and the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention is limited because these Conventions mandate its locus on the high
seas, require two ships to be involved, and stipulate that the action be for
private motives only. As result, these Conventions effectively preclude
universal jurisdiction over the vast majority of piratic activity which is
occurring, or is likely to occur, in the world today.
THE HEED TO ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO PIRACY
Maritime commerce is perhaps the most international of human endeavors, and
piracy is arguably the most international of crimes . It is the international
aspect of piracy which provides its intrigue and serves to complicate
enforcement strategies. The current piracy situation in the Singapore strait
provides an excellent example of how contemporary concepts of maritime
sovereignty militate against the resolution of an international problem.
There, indiscriminant attacks are being made on the world's commercial vessels
exercising their rights of transit passage through portions of an
international strait which lies wholly within the territorial waters of a
single nation. Absent the "high seas" element of the offense, the victimized
vessels ' flag states are unable to exercise their legal rights to pursue and
capture pirates themselves, because the legal authority to combat piracy has
moved from the international sphere to the municipal sphere of the littoral
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state.
The consequences of uncontrolled piracy in the Straits region go far beyond
the potential for injury or loss of life to ship's crews, and the economic
losses associated with sea robbery. The Singapore Strait is one of the most
important commercial and strategic waterways in the world. It is a vital
corridor for the shipment of crude oil from the Persian Gulf to Japan, and as
such, experiences a large volume of Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) traffic.
These low, slow moving vessels are, by an internationally sanctioned traffic
separation scheme, restricted to specifically designated traffic lanes. As a
result they are especially susceptible to attack during a transit passage in
the Strait which takes them through Indonesian territorial waters. A pirate
attack frequently diverts the crew's attention from the safe navigation of the
vessel, thereby increasing the likelihood of a grounding or collision in this
densely trafficked, narrow waterway. Thus the potential for a major oil or
hazardous chemical spill, or blockage of a traffic lane, is a disturbing
possibility. The international ecological and economic consequences from such
a scenario are readily apparent.
The case to be made, of course, is that the safety of navigation in this
waterway is of international concern. Unfortunately, the existing conventional
law permits direct law enforcement action only by Indonesia, the littoral
state in whose territorial waters the most attack prone part of the strait's
traffic lane is located.
Concerns about the adequacy of the international law of piracy to deal with
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situations of maritime terrorism were raised in the wake of the Achille Lauro
affair. Since terrorist attacks generally occur for some political or public
purpose, as opposed to a private purpose, many authorities believe that the
existing conventional piracy doctrine, with its public purposes exclusion, is
inapplicable in situations like that involving the Achille Lauro. As the
popularity of cruising continues to rise, cruise vessels may be viewed by
terrorists as increasingly attractive targets.
Clearly, there is now an urgent need to examine the international law of
piracy, and develop new enforcement strategies which will respect the
sovereignty concerns of littoral states, yet yield effective results against
this international criminal menace .
PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this paper is to identify the shortcomings of the existing
conventional law of piracy vis-a'-vis the current nature of the problem, and
to explore anti-piracy enforcement strategies which will prove viable within
the paradigm of today's notions of the law of the sea and international
relations. Accordingly, it is appropriate first to examine the history of law
of piracy, and observe now the law was shaped by the various maritime states'
desires for, and notions of, maritime order. Therefore Chapter II examines
the nascent law of piracy as applied in the ancient Mediterranean, introduces
the concept of pirates as hostes humani generis, or enemies of the human race,
and explores the emergence of the concept of freedom of the seas and the
development of the idea of universal jurisdiction over pirates.
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Chapter III examines the evolution of the customary law of piracy under the
impact of municipal law. The concepts of municipal and international law are
first distinguished. Then, citing English and American court cases as
precedents, the evolution of the elements of the offense of piracy and the
scope of piracy jurisdiction under the impact of the municipal laws of these
nations are examined.
Chapter IV addresses the codification of the international law of piracy. It
begins with a discussion of the League of Nations' efforts in the early 1920s,
and continues with an examination of the work of the 1932 Harvard Research in
International Law Draft Convention on Piracy. The Harvard Draft provided the
foundation for the subsequent High Seas and 1982 Law of the Sea Conventions'
piracy provisions. The International Law Commission's work on the development
of the piracy articles found in the High Seas and 1982 Law of the Sea
Conventions is explored in some detail for insight into some of the political
considerations which affected the language of the Conventions' articles.
Chapter V critiques the efficacy of the piracy doctrine articulated in the
existing conventional law when applied in the context of maritime terrorism,
and examines the next generation of international measures developed in
response to maritime terrorism. The Santa Maria and Achille Lauro cases are
studied as examples of maritime terrorism as a contemporary aspect of piracy.
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation3 (hereinafter 1988 Rome Convention), developed in the
wake of the Achille Lauro incident, will be reviewed to highlight its
improvement over the previous conventional piracy articles as regards
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responding to incidences of maritime terrorism.
In Chapter VI the piratic attacks in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore
Strait are analyzed as examples of "traditional" piracy in the modern
geopolitical environment. The jurisdictional issues which have hampered
enforcement efforts in the region will be reviewed. Recent anti-piracy
measures being developed and implemented in the Straits region are discussed
and suggestions for improving the anti-piracy measures in the region will be
offered.
Finally, Chapter VII concludes with a look to the future. Forthcoming IMO
proposals are cited, and a call is made for more states to ratify the 1988
Rome Convention.
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CHAPTER II. THE NASCENT LAW OF PIRACY
THREAT AND RESPONSB IN THE AHCIBHT MBDITBRRAHBAH
Piracy has been a troubling aspect of maritime life since antiquity. It has
been observed that "in the Homeric age the practice [of piracy] was looked
upon as a creditable••• means of enrichment.,,4, and in the ancient world
piracy became "a common trade, as was inevitable in a period when there was no
organized maritime power strong enough to put it down."S Early Greek
references using the word "pierato" and its derivatives date from about 140
B.C., and were applied to some specific political and economic communities of
the Eastern Mediterranean. However, analysis of the usage of this term
suggests an appellation describing small communities of fighting men capable
of forming alliances and participating in wars, rather than the classical
notions of brigands outside the legal order. 6
Nonetheless, disruptions to the maritime order of the ancient world by the
existence of pirate communities warranted attention by those states
sufficiently powerful to take action against them. Thus, King Minos of Crete,
in order to secure his revenues, took action to suppress piracy in the Eastern
Mediterranean in the fifteenth century B.C. 7 The growth of Athenian sea
power prompted it to porice the seas between the end of the Persian War in 479
B.C. and the beginning of the peloponnesian War in 431 B.C. In the fifth
century B.C., Solon imposed rules which legalized, but regulated, certain
piratical organizations, in recognition of the mercenary value of such
organizations in time of war. S Agreements among states for the suppression
and control of piracy in the Eastern Mediterranean were also implemented. By
the end of the third century B.C., Rhodes and the Cretan state of Hierapytna
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entered into a treaty which, inter alia, provided for mutual aid against
pirates. The Hierapytnians were to assist the Rhodians in suppressing piracy
in the neighboring seas, with the captured vessels brought to Rhodes and the
booty to be shared between the parties to the treaty.9 However, Roman
inroads against Rhodian naval power by the mid second century B.C. rendered
the latter's anti-piracy efforts ineffectual. l O
THE CONCEPT OF HOSTES HUMANI GENERIS
The expansion of Roman hegemony by the first century B.C. made the existence
of pirate communities unacceptable, particularly when piratical depredations
on Rome's maritime commerce became too costly to ignore. The Roman Senate
passed a law in 68 B.C. whereby Pompey the Great was commissioned to "take the
seas away from the pirates", and in the process destroyed the dockyards and
arsenals of the Cilician pirate villages in Crete. It was about this time that
the noted Roman lawyer and political contemporary of Julius Caesar, Marcus
Tullius Cicero, evaluating the legal power given Pompey to deal with the
pirates, first introduced the concept that pirates were the enemies (hostes)
of all communities. The concept of hostes humani generis, or "common enemies
of all mankind" would, by the seventeenth century, provide the foundation for
establishing piracy as an offense over which jurisdiction was universal. Thus
Sir William Blackstone was to observe in 1790:
"Lastly, the crime of Piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the
high seas, is an offense against the universal law of society; a
pirate being, according to Sir Edward Coke, hostis humani generis.
As therefore, he has renounced all the benefits of society and
government, and has reduced himself afresh to the savage state of
nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all mankind must
declare war against him: so that every community hath a right, by
the rule of self defence, to inflict that punishment upon him
which every individual would in a state of nature have been
otherwise entitled to do, for any invasion of his person or
11
personal property."ll
Indeed, the term hostes humani generis itself became at times, synonymous
with the definition of piracy. This prompted the seventeenth century British
Admiralty jurist Dr. Matthew Tindall to correct this misuse. Tindall noted
that "it is neither a definition nor as much as a description of a pirate, but
a rhetorical invective."12
In actuality, Cicero applied the term in a somewhat more restrictive
context. He denied any legal obligation to keep oaths to pirates on the
grounds that by being enemies (hostes) of all communities, they are not
subject to the law of universal society that makes oaths binding between
different communities. 13 Therefore no ransom need be delivered to a pirate
even if one had sworn to do so because the pirate was not a legal enemy but
the common enemy of all mankind. 14
JUSTINIAN'S DIGEST AND THE RHODIAN CODE
With the spread of Roman power around the Mediterranean, piratical
disruptions diminished. They did not become a serious problem until the fifth
century, when the Roman fleets, which had provided an effective piracy
deterrent, collapsed in the face of the various barbarian invasions throughout
the Empire. The nascent law of piracy as evidenced through international
treaties, maritime custom, and national law, had by the end of the Roman
Empire, become "meagre and uneven.,,15 Justinian's Digest of A.D . 534, often
cited by commentators on pir a c y16 for its historical relevance, concerned
the disposition of persons who had been captured by pirates and robbers,
rather than a broad based proscription of the practice. Similarly, the
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Rhodian Code dealt principally with the financial consequences of piratic
activity rather than its suppression. Thus it has been summarized that the
thrust of the law during this period,
" ... was to regulate from the shore in order to mitigate the
consequences of piracy rather than repress upon the sea. This
approach reflected the relative weakness of states and their
typical lack of sensitivity to the depredations of pirates.
Moreover, the idea of sustained repression was inconsistent with
conventional notions about proper state activity and the prospects
for maritime order. ,,17
INTERNATIONALISM ARRIVES: FREEDOM OF THE SEAS AND THE EMERGENCE OF
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
The growth of international maritime commerce during the Renaissance, and
the subsequent emergence of the Grotian view of international society in the
seventeenth century, would come to have profound implications in the
development of the legal rules against piracy. In this regard, it has been
observed that piracy is the oldest and perhaps only crime over which universal
jurisdiction was generally recognized under customary international law. 18
In 1612, Alberico Gentili, an Italian Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, cited
as the first writer of "lasting eminence,,19 to equate piracy with outlawry
forbidden by international law, observed:
"Pirates are common enemies, and they are attacked with impunity
by all, because they are without the pale of the law. They are
scorners of the law. of nations; · -hence they find no protection in
that law. They ought to be crushed bOus ... and by all men. Thisis a warfare shared by all nations."2
By the seventeenth century, maritime powers began to accept the doctrine of
freedom of the seas as a logical derivative of the economic necessity to
maintain the freedom of navigation necessary to undertake trade with the New
world . 2 1 Piracy, insofar as it represented a threat to the international
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trade of the day, was viewed as a danger to the freedom of navigation which
impacted upon the international community as a whole. As pirates attacked
merchant vessels indiscriminately, they were considered hostes humani generis.
Because they were not subject to the authority of any state, and no state
could be held responsible for their acts, it became accepted by all states
that jurisdiction over pirates should be universal. As one commentator
concludes, "the increasing economic sensitivity of Europe to commercial
disruptions ensured that piracy was widely viewed as a great offense, for the
restraint of which states controlled growing military and political
resources.,,22 The need to protect community interests in economic
development and humanitarian standards thus formed the basis of the
international law establishing piracy jure gentium (by the law of
nations).23 As a result, any state could apprehend pirates, and any state
into whose jurisdiction they were brought could punish them under their own
laws, irrespective of the fact that the crime was committed on the high seas.
GROTIUS AND THE THEORY OF EFFECTIVE OCCUPATION
Authority to bring to bear military and political resources against pirates
received support within the emerging municipal law systems of the various
European states. In an -analysis of the Grotian view of international society
as reflected in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (On the Law of War and Peace),
Professor Rubin cites a passage which suggests a foundation for the extension
of municipal criminal law to the activities of foreigners in certain
locations: the theory of effective occupation: 2 4
"Sovereignty over a part of the sea is acquired in the same way as
sovereignty elsewhere, that is .•• through the instrumentality of
persons and territory. It is gained through the instrumentality
of persons if, for example, a fleet, which is an army afloat, is
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stationed at some point of the sea; by means of territory, insofar
as those who sail over the part of the sea along the coast may be
constrained from the land no less than if they should be upon the
land itself. ,,25
Thus, applying the theory of effective occupation, extension of a state's
municipal laws could be successfully accomplished by the presence of its
warships in those regions of the sea within the military control of that
vessel. This philosophy was embraced by the English courts of the seventeenth
century, which asserted jurisdiction over piracy jure gentium under common
law, and as such determined for themselves the specific elements of the
offense of piracy jure gentium.
THE ELEMENTS OF PIRACY: PRIVATE MOTIVES AND INDISCRIHINANT ATTACK
English jurists of the day wrestled with various aspects of the concept of
piracy. These included questions of property rights, the validity of
commissions associated with the then widespread practice of privateering,26
and the legal classifications of unrecognized or rebellious communities such
as the notorious Barbary states. However, of primary significance in this
analysis is the courts' determination that central to the definition of the
English municipal law crime of piracy were two important elements: first, the
accused must be acting amino furandi (for private motives) and not as part of
a struggle for political 'power, and secondly, the accused's behavior must be
hostes humani generis, i.e., the accused must have been engaged in attacking
all lucrative targets rather than singling out a specific national flag victim
or a narrowly prescribed group of allied flags. Indeed, in contrast to the
previously cited comment of Dr. Tindall dismissing the epithet as mere
"rhetorical invective", his fellow jurist Robert Walton in 1693 argued that
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the concept of permanent and general predation was an essential element of the
charge of piracy, and thus to warrant the term hostes humani generis the
accused must have robbed the vessels of all nations irrespective of flag. 2 7
The 1696 case Rex v. Dawson illustrates the English jurisprudential thinking
on the definition of piracy. In his charge to the jury, Admiralty Court judge
Sir Charles Hedges noted:
"Now piracy is only a sea-term for robbery, piracy being a robbery
committed within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. If any man be
assaulted within that jurisdiction, and his ship or goods
violently taken away without legal authority, this is robbery and
piracy. If the mar-Lnece of any ship shall violently dispossess
the master, and afterwards carry away the ship itself, or any of
the goods, or tackle, apparel, or furniture, with felonious
intention, in any place where the lord Admiral hath, or pretends
to have jurisdiction, this is also robbery and piracy. The
intention will, in these cases, appear by considering the end for
which the fact was committed; and the end will be known, if the
evidence shall shew you what hath been done.,,28
EXPANDING JURISDICTION: NATIONALITY AND NATIONAL INTEREST
Turning to the jurisdictional limits of the English courts, the noted
English scholar Charles Molloy, commenting on the jurisdiction of the
tribunals established under the authority of the Offenses at Sea Act of
1536,29 opined that ,s u c h jurisdiction extended .over all Englishmen on the
basis of nationality alone, provided the offense took place within the
jurisdiction of the English Admiral. 3D Further, the scope of the Act could
be extended to foreigners provided that there was some basis for English legal
interest in their actions, such as the victim being of English nationality, or
if the victim and the accused pirate were both physically present in England
and the matter had not been previously resolved in the victim's own country,
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or finally, on the basis of the Crown's claim at the time to territorial
jurisdiction over large parts of the English Channel. 3 1 With regard to
incidents occurring beyond the scope of English jurisdiction, on the "Ocean",
Molloy observed:
"If Piracy be committed on the Ocean, and the Pirats in the
attempt there happen to be overcome, the Captors are not obliged
to bring them to any Port, but may expose them immediately to
punishment, by hanging them up at the main Yard end before a
departure ••. "
"So likewise, if a ship shall be assaulted by Pirates and in the
Attempt the Pirates shall be overcome, if the Captors bring them
to the next port, and the Judge openly rejects the Trial, or the
Captors cannot wait for a Judge without certain peril or loss,
Justice may be done upon them by the Law of Nature and the same
may be there executed by the captors.,,32
EXPANDING JURISDICTION: UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
The view that piracy was an offense over which universal jurisdiction was
appropriate was introduced by Sir Leoline Jenkins, judge at the Common Law and
later Privy Councillor to King Charles II, in a 1668 jury charge which
declared:
"You are therefore to enquire of all Pirates and Sea-rovers, they
are in the Eye of the Law Hostes humani generis, Enemies not of
one Nation ... only, but of all mankind. They are outlawed, as I
may say, by the Laws of all Nations; that is out of the Protection
of all Princes and of all Laws whatsoever. Every Body is
commissioned, and -i s to be armed against them, as Rebels and
Traytors, to subdue and to root them out.,,33
The theme of universal jurisdiction suggested by Jenkins was employed by
Hedges in the Dawson case previously cited, and though the facts of this case
did not concern foreigners as defendants, it is noteworthy for its far
reaching concepts of jurisdiction:
"The King of England hath not only an empire and sovereignty over
the British seas, but also an undoubted jurisdiction and power, in
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currency with other princes and states, for the punishment of all
piracies and robberies at sea, in the most remote parts of the
world; so that if any person whatsoever, native or foreigner,
Christian or Infidel, Turk or Pagan, with whose country we have no
war, with whom we hold trade and correspondence, and are in amity
shall be robbed or spoiled in the Narrow Seas, the Mediterranean,
Atlantic, Southern, or any other seas, or the branches thereof,
either on this or the other side of the line, it is piracy within
the limits of your enquiry, and the cognizance of this court.,,34
EXPANDING JURISDICTION: THE ABSENCE OF STATE AUTHORITY
The noted Dutch jurist of the eighteenth century, Cornelius Bynkershoek,
also addressed the question of the elements of the offense and the scope of
jurisdiction. His arguments, dealing with the issues of privateering and the
validity of commissions, served to incorporate the concept of absence of state
authority as an essential element in the definition of piracy. Under the
applicable Dutch municipal law, he asserted, "We punish as pirates those who
sail out to plunder the enemy without a commission from the admiral, and
without complying with ..• the rules of the Admiralty of ..• 1597.,,35 However,
it has been suggested that Bynkershoek equivocated when addressing the
jurisdictional question of the authority of Dutch courts to hear cases
involving depredations by one foreigner against another, appearing somewhat
less willing than his English counterparts to apply his nation's municipal law
proscriptions against prracy to piratic activity occurring exclusively between
foreigners. 36
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CHAPTER III. THE CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PIRACY
MUNICIPAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW DISTINGUISHED
Beyond the aspect of its early heritage, piracy is unique because it is
considered both a crime under the municipal laws of the various states, and a
crime under international law. Commentators have been quick to observe that
confusion has arisen because of the use of the two terms: international law
piracy and municipal law piracy.37 Though virtually all of the modern
maritime nations have enacted municipal laws against piratical activity to
protect their maritime commerce,38 ..... the authorities show that the word
'piracy' is one capable of various shades of meaning, and that, even when used
strictly as a legal term, it may cover different subject matters according as
it is considered from the point of view of international or that of municipal
lawyers ..... 39 As cautioned in the Harvard Research Draft:
"It suffices here to give advance warning of the great variety of
opinions as to the scope of the term and to emphasize the
important difference between piracy in the sense of the law of
nations and piracy under municipal law ••. International law piracy
is committed beyond all territorial jurisdiction. Municipal law
piracy may include offenses committed in the territory of the
state. It is to be noted, then, that piracy under the law of
nations and piracy under municipal law are entirely different
subject matters and that there is no necessary coincidence of
fact-categories covered by the term in any two systems of
law ... 40
Some scholars have taken the , position..that international law is strictly a
rule of conduct for international persons or entities, who alone may violate
its provisions. 4 1 Under this view the law of nations is a law between
states only, and the rights, duties, privileges and powers which it defines
appertain only to states; there is no legal universal society of private
persons regulated by international law. 4 2 In the opinion of one of the
leading legal commentators of the nineteenth century, Chancellor James Kent,
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while considering piracy, "one of the most injurious offenses against the law
of nations, ..43 nevertheless concluded that offenses that can be committed by
individuals are to be enforced by the "sanctions of municipal law.,,44
On the contrary there have been jurists who have contended that the law of
nations is akin to municipal law, with individuals being held to be "subjects"
of international law, as states are normally considered to be, rather than
"objects" of international law, as individuals are typically regarded.
Consider the position of James Lorimer, writing in 1872:
..... when the law of nations exercises criminal jurisdiction
directly, it deals with persons whom it claims as its own
citizens. When it punishes pirates, it does not punish the
citizens of the state to which the pirates belonged, but
cosmopolitan criminals, whom it regards as having ceased to be
state citizens altogether in consequence of their having broken
the laws of humanity as a whole, and become enemies of the human
race. Citizen criminals, on the other hand, it simply hands over
to the States whose laws they have broken ... 45
In a more contemporary vein, Professor Clingan has commented:
"The more modern concept of international law, however, tends in
one way or another, directly or indirectly, to recognize the
status of individuals. This is particularly so in the case of
international human rights. Although this is a comparatively new
evolution, it may be that an individual, under international law,
bears internationally punishable responsibilities as well as
rights ... 46
The exceptional jurisdictional status of pirates under international law
holds that they may be punished by any nation into whose jurisdiction they may
fall. Pirate ships relinquish their nationality and can be brought before the
courts of any nation. 4 7 This has suggested to one contemporary observer an
attempt to integrate a rule of expediency into the existing body of
international law, whereby piracy jure gentium directly prescribes rules both
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for state conduct as well as the conduct of the individual pirate, the
effective result being international law regulating the conduct of both the
individual and the state. 48 This squares well with the position taken by
the u.s. Supreme Court in the 1820 Smith case, to be discussed sUbsequently.
MUNICIPAL LAW AFFECTS IHTBRRATIOHAL LAW
To discern elements of the offense of piracy under customary international
law one must distinguish between the elements of piracy unique to individual
states, and the elements of piracy common to all states. 49 Cautions one
commentator, "In every country the international law applied by its courts
tends to become involved with its municipal law. This is particularly true of
the common law countries. "SO Hence, this task is complicated by the fact
that municipal law piracy has been characterized by "periodic additions
according to the legislative whims of the respective nations"Sl who "broaden
or narrow the definition of piracy under their own municipal laws to achieve
their own ends."S2
THE IMPACT OF ENGLISH MUNICIPAL LAW
As one of the world's dominant sea powers the British have had a profound
influence on the development of _maritime law. Their contribution to the
development of the law of piracy has been especially significant, owing in no
small measure to their common law system. Accordingly, an examination of the
English jurisprudential and political thought concerning piracy is appropriate
to place the international law definition in proper context.
As Blackstone characterized the English perception of the customary law on
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the subject in the late eighteenth century:
"By the ancient common law, piracy, if committed by a subject, was
held to be a species of treason, being contrary to his natural
allegiance; and by an alien, to be a felony only; but now, since
the statute of treason, 25 Edw.III, c.2, it is held to be only
felony in a subject .•• The offense of piracy, by common law,
consists in committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon
the high seas, which, if committed upon land, would have amounted
to felony there. But, by statute, some other offenses are made
piracyalso .•. ,,53
The English statutes of the day also deemed as "piracy": any acts of
hostility committed on the high seas by natural born subjects under foreign
commissions against other English subjects; barratry;54 mutiny;55 and
aiding and abetting such offenses. 56
THE SERBASSAH CASE: SHORE BASED GROUPS AS PIRATES
By the mid-nineteenth century, the British had expanded their definition of
piracy and their scope of jurisdiction further still. As the British East
India Company expanded its affairs on the Malay Peninsula and surrounding
waters, the British were forced to come to grips with the various Peninsular
Sultanates, whose activities of "tax collection" and privateering in the
region were viewed by the British as a piratic nuisance to their commercial
endeavors. 57 In 1843 Captain Henry Keppel of H.M.S. Dido attacked some Dyak
villages on north Borneo which he considered to be "piratical." When he
subsequently sought the bounty provided under the Bounty Act of 1825 for an
engagement with "pirates", the British Court of Admiralty was forced to
resolve the question whether the term "pirate" applied to organized groups
operating on land as well as the sea. In the 1852 case known as Serhassan
{Pirates)58 noted Admiralty jurist Dr. Steven Lushington rendered the
decision of the court in the affirmative, holding that indeed shore based
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persons could commit piratic acts when they engaged British naval or
amphibious forces.
INSURGENTS, BELLIGERENTS, AND THE LAW OF PIRACY
Mention of the concept of insurgents and belligerents is appropriate at this
point as further illustration of the evolving nature of the customary law. By
the late nineteenth century, the problem of opposition movements became
especially prevalent due to the numerous revolutions of the period. Under the
customary international law of that time, the rights and legitimacy of
opposition forces in an internal war were determined by the opposition's
status, as determined by third states neutral to the conflict. Thus if the
third state recognized the opposition as "belligerents" then the internal war
took on the character of an international war between two states, each of
which had recognized rights and duties under the laws of war. 5 9 Inherent in
this concept is the distinction between private and public ends. In the
prevailing view of the day, among the rights attributed to belligerents was
that their actions were for public ends rather than private ends, and thus
could not be considered within the scope of piracy.
THE MAGELLAN PIRATES CASE
In the 1853 case of the ' Magellan Pirates, a British ship, the Eliza Cornish,
was at anchor in the Straits of Magellan undergoing repairs when it was seized
by inmates of a nearby Chilean convict settlement. The convicts took the
vessel to sea, in the process killing the master and a passenger who was part
owner of the vessel, whereupon it was recaptured by the British. As it was
being returned to England the Eliza Cornish foundered and was sold in
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Portugal. Initial legal action in this case was in fact an Admiralty
proceeding, wherein the original British owners sought to have the sale to
Portugal annulled on the grounds that the British master exceeded his
statutory authority to dispose of the foundered vessel. While this aspect is
not directly on point as regards the piracy aspects, it is noteworthy for its
reflection of the British interpretation of universal natural laws. Dr.
Lushington held for the British owners, finding the British statutory rule
limiting the master 's power to dispose of the vessel more reflective of a
universal natural law of nations than the Portuguese rule, which vested
broader authority in the master, and would have been more favorable to the
interests of the Portuguese.
The "piracy" aspects of the case turned on application of the British Bounty
Act of 1850, which, if the Chilean convicts were deemed to be "pirates", would
have required the Crown to pay the Eliza Cornish's captors, but if the
convicts were considered "insurgents", then Chile would be responsible for the
costs associated with the temporary loss of the vessel. Dr. Lushington held
that English law considered all persons who were guilty of piratical acts to
be pirates, and piratical acts were robbery and murder on the high seas. Dr.
Lushington then addressed the international law definition, finding:
"Though the municipal law of different countries may and does
differ, in many respects, as to its definition of piracy, yet I
apprehend that all nations agree in this: that acts, such as those
which I have mentioned, when committed upon the high seas, are
piratical acts, and contrary to the law of nations."60
Dr. Lushington also rejected both the notion that attacks had to be
conducted indiscriminately in order to be considered piratic, and that the
actions by the Chilean convicts were acts of insurrection or rebellion. In a
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passage of his decision which has been variously cited6 l Dr. Lushington
opined:
"Even an independent state may, in my opinion, be guilty of
piratical acts. What were the Barbary pirates of older times? What
are many of the African tribes at this moment? It is, I believe,
notorious, that tribes now inhabiting the African coast of the
Mediterranean will send out their boats and capture any ships
becalmed upon their coasts. Are they not pirates, because,
perhaps, their whole livelihood may not depend on piratical acts?
I am well aware that it has been said that a state cannot be
piratical; but I am not disposed to assent to such dictum as a
universal proposition."62
Because however, in the final analysis, no British criminal jurisdiction was
involved, the primary significance of the case rests on its attempt to apply
the British municipal interpretations of international law regarding the
freedom of navigation to promote worldwide British assertions of naval
power. 63 However, Dr. Lushington's dicta foreshadowed aspects of
jurisprudential thought relevant to the twentieth century phenomenon of the
"terrorist state". As noted international law scholar Sir Hersch Lauterpacht
would observe nearly a century after Dr. Lushington:
"It is impossible to admit that individuals, by grouping
themselves into States and thus increasing immeasurably their
potentialities for evil, can confer upon themselves a degree of
immunity from criminal liability and its consequences which they
do not enjoy when acting in isolation.,,64
INSURRECTIONISTS AND .P I RATES DISTINGUISHED
In the 1909 case, Republic of Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance
CO. 6 5 the British held that rebels were not pirates when they acted only
against the government they were opposing. In reaching a conclusion that the
insurrectionists in this case were not pirates, the court distinguished their
actions from those of common pirates, citing that there was an organized
expedition for the purpose of establishing a government in a particular
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territory, and that interference with property was only intended, and only
effected, so far as was necessary for that purpose, and not for plundering
everyone indifferently. Therefore, the insurrectionists were not pirates
because they acted for public ends and limited their actions to a single
government. 66
ATTEKPTED ROBBERY IS PIRACY
In the 1934 landmark case In Re Piracy Jure Gentium6 7 the Judicial
committee of the Privy Council remarked on the evolving definition of piracy,
observing that,
"a careful examination of the subject shows a gradual widening of
the earlier definition of piracy to bring it from time to time
more in consonance with situations either not thought of or not in
existence when the older jurisconsults were expressing their
opinions. ,,68
Thus when two Chinese junks were interrupted in their pursuit and attack of
a third junk by a British naval vessel on the high seas, and brought into Hong
Kong, the question became whether actual robbery is an essential element in
the crime of piracy iure gentium, or whether a frustrated attempt to commit a
piratical robbery is not equally piracy iure gentium. Lord Viscount Sankey
concluded that actual robbery is not an essential element in the crime of
piracy iure gentium, and supported the proposition that piracy be expanded to
include any acts of violence committed in time of peace on the high seas:
"When it is sought to be contended, as it was in this case, that
armed men sailing the seas on board a vessel, without any
commission from any state, could attack and kill everybody on
board another vessel, sailing under a national flag, without
committing the crime of piracy unless they stole, say, an article
worth six-pence, their Lordships are almost tempted to say that a
little common sense is a valuable quality in the interpretation of
international law.,,69
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THE LAW OF PIRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United states, pursuant to Article I, section 8 of the Constitution,
Congress is empowered to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on
the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. Pursuant to Article
III, section 2, the federal judicial power is extended to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Owing to these provisions and the
legislation enacted pursuant thereto, i.e. the Judiciary Act of 24 September
1789 which gave the several District courts civil jurisdiction in all civil
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the piracy law of the United
States is exclusively federal. Since in Federal law there are no common law
or non statutory crimes, it was necessary that piracy be made an offense by
statute.
Thus the Maritime Offenses Act of April 30, 1790 was enacted, the relevant
portion being Section 8 which states:
" ... That if any person shall commit upon the high seas, or in any
river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any
particular state, murder or robbery, or any other offense which if
committed within the body of a county, would by the laws of the
United states be punishable with death; or if any captain or
mariner of any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and
feloniously run away with such ship or vessel, or any goods or
merchandise to the value of fifty dollars, or yield up such a ship
or vessel voluntarily to any pirate; or if any seaman shall lay
violent hands upon his commander, thereby to hinder and prevent
his fighting in the defense of his ship or goods committed to his
trust, or shall make revolt in the ship; every such offender shall
be deemed, taken and adjudged to be a pirate and felon and being
thereof convicted, shall suffer death ..• ,,70
DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE: MURDER AND ROBBERY
section 8 of this Act first came under judicial scrutiny in the 1818 case of
United states v. Palmer et. al. 7 1 The facts indicated that John Palmer of
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Boston and two accomplices boarded the Spanish vessel Industria Raffaelli on
the high seas and "then and there piratically and feloniously did put the
[Rafaelli 's crew] in corporal fear and danger of their lives,,72 and took
certain valuable merchandise from the vessel. The case was originally heard
in the circuit court in Boston, which developed a series of eleven questions
which had to be answered in order to render a decision on the facts. These
eleven questions were then certified to the Supreme Court. The first four
questions concerned the legislative intent of Section B, including whether a
robbery committed upon the high seas should be considered piracy subject to
the death penalty, even though such an act, if committed on land, would not be
punishable by death. The argument being made here is that Congress did not
intend to make a capital offense on the high seas, that which is not a capital
offense on land. Other matters certified questioned whether the common law
definition of robbery could apply to the crime of robbery cited in Section B,
or was it necessary to specifically define it by another act of Congress; and
whether or not robbery committed on the high seas, if committed by aliens
against a United States vessel, or by Americans against an alien vessel, could
be considered a robbery and piracy within the meaning of Section B. The
remaining questions related to the validity of commissions issued by
unrecognized sovereigns:
Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court. Marshall
conceded the notion that Congress did not intend to make a capital offense on
the high seas that which is not a capital offense on land was an argument,
"entitled to great respect on every account; and to the more, because, in
expounding a law which inflicts capital punishment, no over rigid construction
2B
ought to be admitted.,,73 Nonetheless, he deemed the grammatical structure
of the Section at issue precise enough to conclude: "The legislature having
specified murder and robbery particularly, are understood to indicate clearly
the intention that those offenses shall amount to piracy; there could be no
other motive for specifying them. ,,74 Concerning the definition of the term
robbery under the statute, Marshall found no problem in applying the term, "in
the sense which it is recognized and defined at common law.,,75
SCOPE OF JURISDICTION: CITIZENSHIP
The next issue was whether this Act applied to persons who were not American
citizens, nor sailing under the US flag, nor offending against US vessels or
citizens. Marshall, cautious of the impact that an overbroad interpretation
would have with respect to affairs exclusively within the realm of foreign
princes and the sovereigns within his dominion, reasoned that "it would seem
that offenses against the United States, not offenses against the human race,
were the crimes which the legislature intended by this law to punish. ,,76
Thus the Court ruled that the crime of robbery, committed by a person on the
high seas, on board of any ship or vessel belonging exclusively to subjects of
a foreign state, on persons within a vessel belonging exclusively to subjects
of a foreign state, is not piracy within the true intent and meaning of the
act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States.
In a separate opinion, Justice Johnson, who regarded only two of the eleven
certified questions as being material to the case, was disinclined to accept
Marshall's interpretation of the grammatical structure of Section 8. Johnson
cited "several inconsistencies growing out of a construction unfavorable to
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the prisoners.,,77 The first, noted Johnson, was,
"the sanguinary character that it gives to this law in its
operation; for it is literally true, that under it a whole ship's
crew may be consigned to the gallows, for robbing a vessel of a
single chicken, even though a robbery committed on land for
thousands, may not have been made punishable beyond whipping or
confinement. If natural reason is not to be consulted on this
point, at least the mild and benignant spirit of the laws of the
United States merits attention."78
While conceding that Congress can inflict punishment on offenses committed
on board American vessels or by citizens of the US anywhere, Johnson asserted
that Congress cannot make piracy that which is not piracy by the law of
nations, in order to give jurisdiction to its own courts over such offenses.
JURISDICTION OVER STATELESS VESSELS
The Act of 1790's jurisdiction over non-nationals who committed offenses
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the US was limited by the Palmer
holding to those offenses committed against the United States. The authority
of the statute was broadened somewhat in 1820 in United states v .
Klintock79• In this case an American, Ralph Klintock, was placed in command
of a vessel, the Young Spartan, which was commissioned by one, Aury, the self-
proclaimed, but legally unrecognized, "Brigadier of the Mexican Republic and
Generalissimo of the Floridas". While cruising in the Young Spartan, Klintock
came upon the Danish vessel, the Norberg, and during the subsequent boarding
of the Norberg, had his second officer conceal Spanish papers on the vessel.
Klintock then affected to have found the Spanish papers aboard, whereupon he
took possession of the Norberg, debarked the vessel's crew in Cuba, and
directed his second officer to sail the Norberg into Savannah, where he,
Klintock, rendezvoused later in the Young Spartan.
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Klintock argued that Aury's commission exempted him from the charge of
piracy, and that although a fraud was practiced upon the Danish vessel, it was
not in any sense piracy. Chief Justice Marshall disagreed, stating that Aury
had no authority, as an unrecognized "Brigadier of the Mexican Republic or
Generalissimo of the Floridas", to issue commissions to authorize private or
public vessels to make captures at sea, and that the whole transaction taken
together was not a belligerent capture but rather a robbery at sea. While the
fraud practiced upon the Danish ship, "may not of itself constitute
piracy •.. it is an ingredient in the transaction which has no tendency to
mitigate the character of the offense ... BD
Turning to the jurisdictional scope of the 1790 Act, in a reconsideration of
his opinion in the Palmer case, Marshall expanded his position that the Act
must be limited in its operation to offenses committed by, or upon, the
citizens of the United States, ruling:
..... that general piracy, or murder, or robbery, committed in the
places described in the eighth section, by persons on board of a
vessel not at the time belonging to the subjects of any foreign
power, but in possession of a crew acting in defiance of all law,
and acknowledging obedience to no government whatever, is within
the true meaning of this act, and is punishable in the courts of
the United states. Persons of this description are proper objects
for the penal code of all nations; and we think the general words
of the act of congress applying to all persons whatsoever, though
they ought not to be so construed as to extend to persons under
the acknowledged authority of a foreign state, ought to be so
construed as to comprehend those who acknowledge the authority of
no state. Those general terms ought not to be applied to offenses
committed against the particular sovereignty of a foreign power;
but we think they ought to be applied to offenses committed
against all nations, including the United States, by persons who
by common consent are equally amenable to the laws of all
nations ... 81
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THE PIRACY ACT OF 1819
The Klintock case notwithstanding, Justice Johnson's assertion in the Palmer
case relative to the jurisdictional scope of Section 8, was to have a profound
impact on the direction of subsequent anti-piracy legislation. The Piracy Act
of 3 March 181982, "an Act to protect the commerce of the United States, and
punish the crime of piracy", provided, inter alia, authorization for public
armed vessels to protect merchant vessels from piratic depredations, allowed
merchant vessels to capture and subdue pirate ships, and provided for the
disposition of captured pirate vessels in American admiralty courts. The most
significant aspect of this Act was Section 5, which was drafted in response to
the jurisdictional constraints imposed on the 1790 Act following the Palmer
decision. Section 5 declared:
"That if any person or persons soever, shall, on the high seas,
commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and
such offend~r or offenders, shall afterwards be brought into or
found in the United States, every such offender or offenders,
shall, upon conviction thereof ... be punished with death. ,,83
THE CORNERSTONE OF AMERICAN PIRACY LAW: U.S.v. SMITH
The 1820 case of United States v. Smith8 4 has been frequently cited as
America's leading case in defining piracy, and as was previously observed,
serves to support the proposition that international law can regulate the
conduct of both the individual and the state. Thomas Smith was a crewmember
of the vessel Creollo, which was commissioned by the government of Buenos
Ayres [sic], then a colony at war with Spain. In March 1819, as the Creollo
was in the port of Margaritta, Smith and others mutinied aboard the Creollo,
departed that vessel and seized a vessel lying nearby, the Irresistible, which
was commissioned by the government of Artigas, who was also at war with Spain.
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Smith took off on a cruise with the Irresistible, without any documents or
commission, and proceeded to plunder and rob a Spanish vessel.
The case was originally brought before the circuit court of Virginia, which
certified the case to the Supreme Court to decide if Smith's actions were
"piracy as defined by the law of nations" so as to be punishable under the
Piracy Act of 3 March 1B19. The first issue in the case, argued Daniel
Webster, counsel for the defendant, was whether the Congress was bound to
specifically define the offense of piracy and not leave it to be ascertained
by judicial interpretation. Writing for the majority, Justice Story held that
Congress indeed had the power to define and punish felonies on the high seas,
and offenses against the law of nations, and "there is nothing which restricts
it to a mere logical enumeration in detail of all the facts constituting the
offense. Congress may as well define by using a term of a known and
determinate meaning, as by an express enumeration of all the particulars
included in that term."BS This of course led to the next question, whether
the crime of piracy is defined by the law of nations with reasonable
certainty.
Story held that despite the diversity of definitions, one constant is that
robbery, or forcible depredations upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy.
Story further observed that the common law recognized piracy not as a crime
against a state's own municipal code, but as a crime against the law of
nations. Citing the opinions of numerous jurists including Sir Charles Hedges,
Sir Leoline Jenkins, and Sir William Blackstone, Story noted:
" ..• whether we advert to writers on the common law, or the
maritime law, or the law of nations, we shall find, that they
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universally treat of piracy as an offense against the law of
nations, and that its true definition by that law is robbery upon
the sea. And the general practice of all nations in punishing all
persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this
offense against any persons whatsoever, with whom they are in
amity, is a conclusive proof, that the offense is supposed to
depend, not upon the particular provisions of any municipal code,
but upon the law of nations, both for its definition and
punishment.,,8G
Thus, story ruled that "piracy, by the law of nations, is robbery upon the
sea, and that it is sufficiently and constitutionally defined by the fifth
section of the act of 1819,,,87 and that Smith's actions as charged in the
indictment, "completely fit the definition.,,88
To scholars who subscribe to the view that individuals can not violate
international law, the fact that the Court did not make any distinction
between piracy at municipal law and piracy under the law of nations, has been
regarded as the case's great weakness. 8 9 In dissent, Justice Livingston
rejected the majority's view that piracy according to international law could
be the basis of a nation's jurisdiction, arguing that "if in criminal cases
everything is sufficiently certain, which by reference may be rendered so,
which was an argument used at bar, it is not perceived why a reference to the
laws of China, or to any other foreign code, would not have answered the
purpose quite as well as the one which has been resorted to in this case.,,90
EXPANDING THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE: PRIVATEERING
While the Smith case established that, at least from the American
perspective, piracy by the law of nations meant robbery at sea animo furandi,
that was by no means the only criteria. Following the Smith case the Court
continued to hear piracy cases with an eye towards defining the jurisdictional
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and evidentiary scope of the offense as intended by statute, particularly as
it applied to the then ubiquitous practice of privateering. In 1820, the
Court ruled in u.s. v. Griffen and Brailsford9 1 that a commission from a
foreign belligerent would not protect an American from punishment for his
offenses against vessels of the us. Especially interesting in this case was
the Court's finding that a vessel within one marine league of the shore, at
anchor in an open roadstead where vessels only ride under the shelter of the
land, is "upon the high seas" for the purpose of applying Section 8 of the
Crimes Act of 1790. 9 2
ABSENCE OF A VALID COMMISSION OR LACK OF NATIONAL CHARACTER
In the 1820 case u.s. v. Holmes,93 the Court again returned to the
jurisdictional question posed by a murder on the high seas on a vessel not
belonging to citizens of the us. Briefly, a Spanish vessel was seized by two
privateers out of Buenos Ayres, and a prize crew placed aboard. The prize
master was murdered by the members of the prize crew; one was an American and
the others were foreigners. Writing for the majority, Justice Washington
reasoned that murder or robbery committed on the high seas may be an offense
cognizable by the courts of the us under certain circumstances, regardless of
the fact that it may have been committed on board a vessel not belonging to
citizens of the US, and without a national character, possessed by pirates or
persons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign country. Applying
the rationale laid out in the Klintock case, Justice Washington held that if
an act of murder be committed either by a citizen or a foreigner, on board a
piratical vessel, "the offense is equally cognizable by the courts of the
United States under the statute concerning piracy.,,94 The key to this case,
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as in Klintock, was that the vessel was not recognized as having a national
character, or valid commission. In a series of cases consolidated during the
February 1820 term under the rubric US v. Pirates9 5, the Court held, inter
alia, that a vessel loses her national character by assuming a piratical
character, and a piracy committed by a foreigner, from on board such a vessel,
upon any other vessel whatever is punishable under Section 8 of the Act of
1790.
DEFINING "PIRATICAL CHARACTER"
In adjudging what constitutes piratical character two Supreme Court cases
are illustrative. In 1821, the US warship Alligator, engaged in a cruise
against pirates and slave traders, encountered the Portuguese trader the
Marianna Flora off of the coast of Africa. Shortly after the meeting the
Marianna Flora shortened her sail and hove to, and together with other
maneuvers, suggested to the captain of the Alligator that the former vessel
was in distress or wished information. As the Alligator approached, the
Portuguese vessel fired upon her, whereupon the Alligator captured the trader
and brought her to Boston as a captured pirate ship. In writing for the Court
Justice Story held that a piratical aggression by an armed vessel, sailing
under a flag of any nation, may be subjected to the penalty of confiscation
) ;
for such a gross breach of the law of nations. However, he noted, "every
hostile attack, in a time of peace, is not necessarily piratical. It may be a
mistake, or in necessary self defense, or to repel a supposed meditated attack
by pirates. ,,96 The Court decreed the return of the vessel to its Portuguese
owners, but released the Alligator's captain from liability for damages
resulting from the wrongful, but reasonable, seizure.
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A year after the Marianna Flora incident, the Palmyra, a Spanish privateer,
was taken into custody by an American vessel, after having plundered two
French vessels. There were defects in the Spaniard's commission, in that it
had been issued to a different vessel under a different captain, and had in
any event expired; it was reissued to the Palmyra by a minor Spanish official
of undocumented authority. The Palmyra's owners sued the American captors for
damages, claiming unjustified interference with her voyage. (It should be
noted that this was an in rem proceeding, vice a criminal adjudication).
Accordingly, Justice Story held that the captors had not met the evidentiary
burden of proving the Palmyra was a pirate, because the mere irregularity of
the vessel's papers and her actions against the two French vessels did not
constitute piracy for a criminal prosecution. 9 7 Insofar as the in rem
proceeding was concerned, Story found that, "taking the circumstances
together, the Court thinks that they presented, prima facie, a case of
piratical aggression ••• within the acts of Congress, open to explanation
indeed. "98 Significant in this case however is an extension of American
jurisdiction to foreign vessels suspected of "robbery at sea" against other
foreign vessels with no clear American interest in the transaction. 99
Justice Story further expanded the definition of piracy, as well as the
scope of America's jurisdiction, in the 1844 in rem case u.S. v. Brig Malek
Adhel 10 0. The pertinent facts here are that the American brig Malek Adhel,
while on a commercial voyage from New York to California, apparently attacked
at least five other vessels of various nationalities; actual depredation and
plunder was alleged with regard to only one of the vessels, however the others
were fired on to sink or harass them. Addressing first the jurisdictional
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issue, story found that the reference in section 4 of the Act of 1819 to "any
vessel or boat from which any piratical aggression ... [shall be made]" extended
equally to all armed vessels which commit the unlawful acts specified therein.
concerning the question of whether the action complained of was piratical
within the purview of the Act, Story rejected the claimants argument that the
Act did not intend to punish any aggression, which if carried into complete
execution, would not amount to positive piracy in contemplation of law. 10 l
Finding that piratic acts must be done animo furandi or lucri causa and with a
view to plunder a "narrow and limited interpretation", Story instead viewed
the general law of nations to apply the term "piratical",
"in a general sensei importing that the aggression is unauthorized
by the law of nations, hostile in character, wanton and criminal
in its commission and utterly without sanction from any public
authority or sovereign power. In short it means that the act
belongs to the class of offenses which pirates are in the habit of
perpetrating, whether they do it for purposes of plunder, or for
purposes of hatred, revenge, or wanton abuse of power •.. If he
willfully sinks or destroys an innocent merchant ship, without any
other object than to gratify his lawless appetite for mischief, it
is just as much a piratical aggression, in the sense of the law of
nations, and of the act of Congress, as if he did it solely and
exclusively for the sake of plunder, lucri causa. The law looks
to it as an act of hostility, and being committed by a vessel not
commissioned and engaged in lawful warfare, it treats it as the
act of a pirate, and of one who is emphatically hostis humani
generis.,,102
INSURGENTS AS PIRATES
In the 1885 case United States v. The Ambrose Light103 a district court,
in refusing to exempt insurgents from being considered pirates, stated,
"the liability of the vessel to seizure, as piratical, turns
wholly upon the question whether the insurgents had or had not
obtained any previous recognition of belligerent rights, either
from their own government, or from the political or executive
department of any other nation; and in the absence of recognition
by any government whatever, the tribunals of other nations must
hold such expeditions as this to be technically piratical."
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The court further held that insurgents who,
"send out vessels of war are, in legal contemplation, merely
combinations of private persons engaged in unlawful depredations
on the high seas; .•• that in blockading ports which all nations are
entitled to enter, they attack the rights of all mankind; .•. that
such acts are therefore piratical, and entitle the ships and
tribunals of every nation whose interests are attacked or menaced,
to suppress, at their discretion, such unauthorized warfare by the
seizure and confiscation of the vessels engaged in it.,,104
PIRACY DEFINED BY AN AMERICAN COLONIAL COURT APPLYING FOREIGN LAW
In what was perhaps the most expansive American pronouncement on the scope
of piracy jurisdiction came in the 1922 case, People v. Lol-Lo and
saraw l OS. The facts indicate that a Filipino boarded a Dutch vessel in the
territorial waters of the Dutch East Indies, then raped the women and sank the
vessel with the men still aboard. An American colonial court in the
Philippines applying Philippine law, affirmed a conviction for piracy. The
court rejected an appeal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, holding
irrelevant the fact that the crime occurred within the jurisdictional three
mile limit of a foreign state because "the jurisdiction of piracy unlike all
other crimes has no territorial limits.,,106
THE IMPACT OF A BROADENED CUSTOMARY DEFINITION OF PIRACY
As the forgoing discussion of case law has indicated, the "pertinent
international doctrine has varied in interpretation and application based on
national attitudes and perceptions towards piracy and politics. ,,107 As the
customary definition of piracy broadened under the impact of municipal laws,
conflicts developed over the treatment of piracy. By the conclusion of the
first World War, there was a considerable confusion of opinion among scholars
on the issue of piracy, owing primarily to the distinction of piracy in the
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strict sense of the word, as defined by international law, and piracy as
defined by the municipal laws and treaties among individual states. lOB
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CHAPTER IV. CODIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PIRACY
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS' INITIATIVE
In 1924, the League of Nations' Committee of Experts for the Progressive
codification of International Law examined piracy as one of the subjects of
international law for which regulation by international agreement would be
desirable and realizable. On 26 January 1926, under the direction of
Rapporteur M. Matsuda of Japan, the Committee developed eight articles, the
"Draft Provisions for the Suppression of Piracy,"109 which in Professor
Rubin's analysis, reflected the assumption that there is a single conception
of piracy in the international legal order reflecting a stable natural law
that did not change over time. 110 Significant points of the Draft were
that it restricted acts of piracy to the high seas, limited them to private
acts by private ships, exempted acts committed for a purely political
objective, and allowed third party states to make determinations regarding
belligerency status independent of the determination made by the insurgent's
own government, although insurgents' actions not inspired by purely political
motives would be considered piratical. Article 5 permitted foreign vessels to
engage in hot pursuit of pirates from the high seas into the territorial
waters of a littoral state in instances where the littoral state was unable to
continue the pursuit itself, provided that the "affair shall be remitted for
judgement to the competent authorities of the littoral state."lll
Unfortunately, it appeared that the international community of the day
thought that piracy had become less than a pressing issue, and given that the
Draft did not engender universal agreement, the topic was dropped from the
League's subsequent Codification Conference. 112
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INSURGENCY AND BELLIGERENCY REVISITED: PIRACY BY ANALOGY
While the issue of piracy did not result in the adoption of a treaty on the
subject by the League's Codification Conference, it did, nevertheless, surface
in connection with the laws of war being debated at the time, in the context
of "piracy by analogy". At the Washington Conference of 1922 on the
Limitation of Armaments, a consensus developed among several of the
participating states that the customary international law of war forbade the
destruction of a merchant vessel unless the vessel's crew and passengers had
first been placed in safety. They specifically affirmed that this concept
applied to belligerent submarines. A product of the Conference was the Treaty
Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious Gases in Wartime. 113 In
pertinent part the Treaty held that:
"Any person in the service of any power who shall violate any of
those rules, whether or not such person is under orders of a
governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws
of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an
act of piracy [italics mine) and may be brought to trial before
the civil or military authorities of an1 Power within thejurisdiction of which he may be found." 14
The Nyon Agreement of 1937,115 also adopted the "piracy by analogy"
concept. The Agreement was concluded among nine states in response to attacks
on merchant vessels in the Mediterranean by unidentified aircraft and
submarines acting on behalf of insurgents during the Spanish civil war. The
Preamble of the Agreement states, "Whereas these attacks are violations of the
rules of international law ••• and constitute acts contrary to the most
elementary dictates of humanity, which should be justly treated as acts of
piracy••• ,,116
In the Americas, the Havana Convention on civil Strifel 17 dealt with the
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issue of piracy and insurgency, and provided, inter alia: "The declaration of
piracy against vessels which have risen in arms, emanating from a Government,
is not binding upon the other States." Further provisions of the convention
allowed States injured by insurgents' warships to capture them, but return
them to their state of origin for trial, whereas insurgent merchantmen may be
captured by the injured State and be subject to the penal codes of the injured
State.
Commentators have criticized the Washington and Nyon approaches as
unjustified, inappropriate, and unnecessary attempts to extend the scope of
piracy jure gentium. lIB At best these measures achieved some propaganda
effect based upon the stigma value of applying the epithet "pirate" to
instances of belligerent submarine attacks. 119 The specifications laid out
in the Havana Convention lacked the force of anti-piracy laws since they fell
short of prescribing a universal jurisdiction against political
insurgents. 12 0
CORNERSTONE OF THE MODERN CONVENTIONAL LAW: THE HARVARD RESEARCH DRAFT
The efforts of the League of Nations' Committee of Experts preparatory to
the Codification Conference prompted Harvard Law School to undertake its own
research efforts to contribute to the Conference. The Harvard Research
program was organized, and a committee was set up to explore the issue of
piracy independently from Matsuda and the League. The result of the effort
was a full draft convention of nineteen Articles published in 1932,121
which would provide the foundation for the piracy provisions adopted in
subsequent international conventions.
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JURISDICTION OVER PIRACY: NATURALISTS VB. POSITIVISTS
One of the first matters to be debated by the Harvard Drafters was the
question of whether piracy was in fact an international crime over which
universal jurisdiction could be asserted. It has been observed previously in
this paper that there have been publicists who contend that individuals can be
"subjects" of international law. Thus, according to this "naturalist"
jurisprudential thought, the international law of piracy is a valid set of
rules established by universal reason which is immediately applicable to
individuals, but because the international community has no tribunal whereby
private individuals can be prosecuted for crimes against the international
community, it is left to the individual states to punish the offenders. The
other viewpoint previously discussed is the "positivist" position, Le. that
only states are the proper subjects of international law, therefore there are
no international crimes for which individuals may be punished . Only states
have the legal capacity to enforce their domestic laws over their citizens.
Under the positivist position then, the international law of piracy is not an
expression of an international crime, but rather recognition by the
international community of the propriety of individual states extending their
jurisdictions to apply their municipal law upon the high seas irrespective of
the nationality of the offender. 12 2
The Harvard Drafters adopted a positivist stance, arguing that since there
was no international agency to capture and prosecute pirates, nor did the
various state municipal codes all provide for the punishment of pirates whose
offenses took place outside of the state's ordinary jurisdiction, piracy could
not be a crime by the law of nations in the sense which a strict technical
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interpretation would give the term. 12 3 Thus rejecting the notion of an
international crime subject to a universality of jurisdiction, the Drafters
instead found piracy by the law of nations to be, "a special, common basis of
jurisdiction beyond the familiar grounds of personal allegiance, territorial
dominion, dominion over ships, and injuries to interests under the state's
protection. ,,124 The theory of the draft convention was that piracy was not
a crime by the law of nations but rather,
" .•• the basis of an extraordinary jurisdiction in every state to
seize and to prosecute and punish persons, and to seize and
dispose of property, for factual offences which are committed
outside the territorial and other ordinary jurisdiction of the
prosecuting state and which do not involve attacks on its peculiar
interests. ,,125
The purpose of the convention was thus to define the extraordinary
jurisdiction in general outline. In doing so the Drafters examined the
concept of the common jurisdiction of all states to prosecute and punish
pirates and were influenced by the writings of the German positivist, Paul
Stiel. Stiel's thesis was that a "special authority" over piracy was a matter
of "sea policing" consisting of the permissibility and other legal effects of
state acts on the high seas with respect to foreign ships, property, and
persons, which, absent the "special authority" over piracy, would be
violations of international law. Stiel defined piracy as, " a non political
professional course of robbery against nearly all countries undertaken at
sea,,,126 and it was this piratical lifestyle that each state was presumed
to have the authority to suppress by its sea policing. 12 7 The Drafters
then reconciled Stiel's view with the traditional Anglo-American view that
piracy is a special basis of jurisdiction to prosecute and punish foreigners
for offenses committed beyond the state's ordinary authority, and resolved
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that the draft convention should include the recognition of a special
authority, or jurisdiction, to prosecute piracy. The Drafters ultimately
concluded that, "piracy, however it is defined, is a special basis of
jurisdiction, judicial, legislative, executive, and administrative.,,128
PIRACY DEFINED
While a detailed analysis of all nineteen articles of the Draft will not be
attempted here, it is relevant to briefly review the definitional and
jurisdictional articles, as they provided an important jurisprudential
foundation for subsequent international codification efforts. Thus:
ARTICLE 2: Every state has jurisdiction to prevent piracy and
punish persons and to seize and dispose of property because of
piracy •••
ARTICLE 3: Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a
place not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state:
1. Any act of violence or depredation committed with intent to
rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person with intent
to steal or destroy property, for private ends without bona fide
purpose of asserting a claim of right, provided that the act is
connected with an attack on or from the sea or in or from the air.
If the act is connected with an attack which starts from on board
ship, either that ship or another ship which is involved must be a
pirate ship or a ship without national character.
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
with knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship.
3. Any act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an act
described in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this article.
The Drafters conceded that the definitional article was the most important
and difficult one of the convention, in large part because of the "chaos of
expert opinion as to what the law of nations includes, or should include, in
piracy,,,129 there was no authoritative definition of piracy. The drafters
evaluated some sixteen different acts which could occur on the high seas.
46
These included: appropriation of a ship for unlawful private ends by mutiny of
the crew or passengers; using a ship to attack another for some political
purpose provided the attack is not made under authority or protection of any
state or recognized belligerent government; and any unjustifiable act of
violence or depredation committed for private ends on board a pirate ship or a
ship which is not under the peculiar jurisdiction and protection of some
state. The Drafters also considered elements of the offense, such as it being
a menace to the commerce or other interests of all states, in settling on the
above definition.
Central to the Drafters~ thinking was that expediency should be the chief
guide in the formulation of a convention. As a result, certain earlier
concepts of piracy, including cases of wrongful attacks on persons or property
for political ends, whether they were made on behalf of states, recognized
belligerent organizations, or unrecognized revolutionary bands, were thought
by the Drafters to be better left to the jurisdiction of the injured state,
the state or recognized government on whose behalf the forces were acting, or
the states of nationality and domicile of the offender, and therefore were
omitted from the draft convention definition. Also, cognizant of the need to
avoid encroachment on the exclusive jurisdiction of an individual state, the
Drafters were careful to denominate the basis upon which common jurisdiction
could be asserted. Limitations were designed to exclude offenses committed in
a place subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of a state, as the Drafters
considered that the prevailing professional opinion did not sanction an
extension of the common jurisdiction of all states to cover those offenses
committed entirely on board an individual vessel, which under international
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law, is under the exclusive jurisdiction of its flag state. Hence, the
Drafters maintained that if an attack or attempt takes place from on shipboard
there must also be involved a pirate ship, or one without national character.
As has been argued by several contemporary commentators, the failure of the
Drafters to include in their definition unlawful attacks on persons or
property for public purposes, and the implicit requirement that more than one
ship be involved, were limitations, which when adopted into subsequent
conventions, rendered conventional law ineffective when dealing with present
day situations involving maritime terrorism. 130
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND HOT PURSUIT OF PIRATES
ARTICLE 4: 1. A ship is a pirate ship when it is devoted by the
persons in dominant control to the purpose of committing an act
described in the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 3, or to
the purpose of committing any similar act within the territory of
a state by descent from the high seas, provided in either case
that the purposes of the persons in dominant control are not
definitely limited to committing such acts against ships or
territory subject to the jurisdiction of the state to which the
ship belongs.
2. A ship does not cease to be a pirate ship after the
commission of an act described in paragraph 1 of Article 3, or
after the commission of any similar act within the territory of a
state by descent from the high seas, as long as it continues under
the same control.
ARTICLE 6: In a pIace not within the territorial jurisdiction of
another state, a state may seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by
piracy and possessed by pirates, and things or persons on board.
ARTICLE 7: l.In a place within the territorial jurisdiction of
another state, a state may not pursue or seize a pirate ship or a
ship taken by piracy and possessed by pirates; except that if
pursuit of such a ship is commenced by a state within its own
territorial jurisdiction or in a place not within the territorial
jurisdiction of any state, the pursuit may be continued into or
over the territorial sea of another state and seizure may be made
there, unless prohibited by the other state.
2. If a seizure is made within the territorial jurisdiction of
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another state in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of
this article, the state making the seizure shall give prompt
notice to the other state, and shall tender possession of the ship
and other things seized and the custody of the persons seized.
The intent here was to prevent the escape of pirates who attempted to elude
pursuers by entering territorial waters, and thus could not be lawfully
captured. The Drafters acknowledged a diversity of legal opinion on the issue
of hot pursuit of pirates. Some authorities assert that the law of nations
authorizes the pursuit of pirates into foreign territorial waters in
situations where the littoral state has no capability to apprehend the pirates
and does not prohibit the pursuit, while other authorities contend that the
pursuit is legal even if the littoral state protests. Nonetheless, the
Drafters thought that article 7 struck a satisfactory balance between the
rights of the pursuing state and the sovereignty rights of the littoral state.
THE RIGHT OF VISIT
ARTICLE 9: If a seizure because of piracy is made by a state in
violation of the jurisdiction of another state, the state making
the seizure shall, upon the demand of the other state, surrender
or release the ship, things and persons seized, and shall make
appropriate restitution.
ARTICLE 11: 1.In a place not within the territorial jurisdiction
of any state, a foreign ship may be approached and on reasonable
suspicion that it -is a pirate ship or a ship taken by pirates, it
may be stopped and questioned to ascertain its character.
2. If the ship is neither a pirate ship nor a ship taken in
piracy and possessed by pirates, and if it is not subject to such
interference on other grounds, the state making the interference
shall be liable to the state to which the ship belongs for any
damage caused by the interference.
These provisions found their way into the draft convention in recognition of
the common acceptance in earlier times, when piracy was rampant, of warships'
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authority to stop and search other vessels on the high seas upon suspicion of
piracy, without liability. However, the Drafters also believed that in modern
times the right of search as a police measure was no longer of pressing
importance, and in any event, would be met with resistance by states objecting
to foreign interference with their commerce on the high seas. Hence the
liability clause was included.
CAPTURE AND PROSECUTION OF PIRATES
ARTICLE 14: 1. A state which has lawful custody of a person
suspected of piracy may prosecute and punish that person.
2. Subject to the provisions of this convention, the law of the
state which exercises such jurisdiction defines the crime, governs
the procedure and prescribes the penalty •••
4. A state may intercede diplomatically to assure this protection
to one of its nationals who is accused in another state.
This article was included to ensure that the capturing state had
jurisdiction to prosecute pirates. The Drafters acknowledged that the legality
of the seizure depends primarily upon the law of nations, i.e., under the
customary international law of the day, any state could capture pirates upon
the high seas, and the tribunals of any state into whose jurisdiction the
pirates were brought, could try an~ sentence pirates. The legal power of the
state to effect a seizure in areas other than the high seas may be enlarged or
restricted by its agreements with other states.
ILLEGAL FORCIBLE ACTS FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES
ARTICLE 16: The provisions of this convention do not diminish a
state's right under international law to take measures for the
protection of its nationals, its ships and its commerce against
interference on or over the high sea, when such measures are not
based upon jurisdiction over piracy.
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This article was included by the Drafters in recognition of the problem of
illegal forcible acts for political ends against foreign commerce, committed
by unrecognized organizations; in effect it offset the "private ends"
requirement. Article 16 is noteworthy as a matter of prescience. While the
Drafters realized that the traditional notion of piracy, i.e. attacks by
roving brigands on the high seas was largely a phenomenon of a previous
century (insofar as such attacks were now confined to specific geographic
regions, typically within the territorial jurisdiction of a single state), new
methods and reasons for committing piratic, or now terrorist, acts supplanted
the traditional notion. However, rather than accepting the argument that
attacks by revolutionary organizations be classified as piratic in the
international law sense, the Drafters felt that such incidents were not cases
falling under the common jurisdiction of all states as piracy under customary
law, but were special offenses for which the perpetrators may be punished by
the offended state as it saw fit. Because of the political ramifications of
these modern types of cases, the Drafters were reluctant to concede
jurisdiction on the grounds of piracy in the international sense to states not
threatened or offended by the incident. Thus this article does not dictate a
specific course of action, but merely preserves such criminal or police
jurisdiction as is provided by customary law.
THE IMPACT OF THE HARVARD RESEARCH DRAFT
In the final analysis, the work of the Harvard Researchers had a profound
impact on the development of subsequent international legal efforts because it
demonstrated both the theoretical and practical problems which would confront
the international community if it was desirous of developing a convention on
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the subject of piracy .131 While commentators, in light of such modern
incidents as the Santa Maria and Achille Lauro cases, have criticized the
Drafters' work for its pUblic purposes exclusion and two ship requirement, it
must be borne in mind that this work was not intended to be a static, terminal
effort. As the Drafters themselves advised:
"A codification of the jurisdiction of states under the law of
nations should not be drafted to fit only cases raised by present
conditions of business, the arts, and criminal operations.
Continual amendment should be obviated by foresight as far as
possible. ,,132
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: PIRACY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
The International Law Commission (ILC), an organ of the United Nations, was
established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution l74(II) of 21 November
1947, to, inter alia, prepare draft conventions on subjects which have not yet
been regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet
been sufficiently developed in the practice of States. In 1954, the UN tasked
the ILC with preparing a text which could form the basis for an international
agreement on the law of the sea. A text entitled "Regime of the High Seas"
was prepared by the ILC's Special Reporter J.P.A. Francois. Published in March
1954, it contained six articles dealing directly with piracy. 133 Francois
developed the six piracy articles based on the work of the Harvard
Researchers.
PIRACY AND POLITICS
The ILC began to discuss Francois' substantive piracy provisions at its
290th meeting on 12 May 1955. It became clear very quickly that the topic of
piracy was subject to a variety of political considerations. As discussions
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began concerning Francois' Article 23, the definition of piracy (Francois'
French translation of the Harvard Research Draft Article 3), the Po lish
government submitted its formal observations,134 which in essence accused
the Republic of China (ROC) of piracy. Briefly, between the period of August
1949 and December 1953 some 70 merchantmen of various flags were being stopped
on the high seas in the south China Sea enroute to the People's Republic of
China (PRC), by warships of the ROC. Two Polish merchantmen, the Praca and
Prezydent Gottwald were seized on the high seas and brought to Taiwan.
According to Poland:
"The circumstances of the seizure of both Polish ships clearly
shows that violence was used against them . This is thus the main
evidence that the act committed against Polish vessels has marks
of piracy .•• In these concrete cases there was also animus furandi-
i.e. the intent to plunder for gain confirmed by many lawyers as
an element of piracy .•• The seizure of Polish ships which finds no
justification in international law is qualified as piracy, as
delictum jure gentium, and it should be treated accordingly •.• The
formulation of Article 23 of the draft is in conflict with
established views on piracy. It should be clear that "bona fide
purpose of asserting a claim of right" cannot be used in connexion
with such acts as robbery, rape, wounding, enslavement and
killing. It should be clear, for instance, that robbery or
enslavement, being by their nature illegal and criminal, could not
be committed with a bona fide purpose. Similarly the words "for
private ends" should be omitted, since no ends, even when
described by the perpetrators as not being "private" (Le. public)
can justify acts of piracy. The present wording of Article 23, if
accepted and embodied in an international convention, could be
used by pirates to justify an action by maintaining that their
action had the bona fide "purpose of asserting a claim of right,
and that they were not acting "for private ends".135
While it was ultimately determined that the Polish note was a complaint
against the ROC outside the scope of the ILC agenda,136 it nevertheless
prompted debate on the concept of animus furandi as an essential element of
the international offense of piracy. It is also significant to illustrate the
various positions that nations could take concerning alleged piratical acts on
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the high seas. 13 7
MUTINY AND "STATE PIRACY"
The drafting committee debated a variety of other issues as well. Concerning
the proper distinction between piracy and mutiny, the committee accepted the
opinion of the United Kingdom's representative Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. He
concluded that mutiny was a matter of flag state jurisdiction and that it
could not be regarded as piracy until the actions of the mutineers were
directed towards another vessel, or persons on board another vessel. This
position thereby further ingrained the two ship philosophy into the modern
international definition of piracy.138
Representatives from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia relied upon the
Nyon Agreement to push for a view which would have recognized as "state
piracy" actions such as the Nationalist Chinese seizures of Polish
merchantmen. This view was defeated however, thus ensuring the "for private
ends" concept would be incorporated into future codification efforts as
well. 139
DUTY TO REPRESS PIRACY
The ILC presented its piracy articles, which reflected in general an
endorsement of the findings of the Harvard Research effort, at the conclusion
of the Seventh Session in 1955. 140 The piracy section began with a general
policy statement:
ARTICLE 13: All states shall co-operate to the fullest extent
possible in the repression of piracy on the high seas.
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The ILC's conunentary to this article regarded as "sound principle" that "any
State having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy and neglecting
to do so would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law.,,14l
The conunission qualified this however, noting "obviously, the State must be
allowed a certain latitude as to the measures it should take to this end in
any individual instance.,,142
THE ILC's DEFINITION OF PIRACY
ARTICLE 14: Piracy is any of the following acts:
1. Any illegal act of violence, detention, or any act of
depredation directed against persons or property and conunitted for
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private vessel or
private aircraft:
(a) Against a vessel on the high seas other than that on which the
act is conunitted, or
(b) Against vessels, persons or property in territory outside the
jurisdiction of any State.
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or aircraft with knowledge of facts which make the ship or
aircraft a pirate ship or aircraft •..
In its official conunentary the conunission acknowledged consideration of
certain controversial points. 1 43 It first concluded that the intention to
rob, animus furandi, is not required insofar as acts of piracy may be
motivated by feelings of hatred or revenge, and not merely by the desire for
gain. Secondly, it resolved that the acts must be conunitted for private ends.
The Conunission's third conunent: "Save in the case provided for in article 15,
piracy can be conunitted only by merchant vessels, not by warships, ,,144 was
a rejection of the argument used by certain members of the conunission that the
Nyon Agreement, "endorsed a new right in the process of development", i.e. the
right to repress as piracy acts perpetrated by warships. Rather, the
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Commission concluded:
"In view of the immunity from interference by other ships which
warships are entitled to claim, the seizures of such vessels on
suspicion of piracy might involve the gravest of consequences.
Hence the Commission feels that to assimilate unlawful acts
committed by warships to acts of piracy would be prejudicial to
the interests of the international community.,,145
The Commission also held that piracy can only be committed on the high seas
or outside the territorial jurisdiction of any state. While recognizing some
dissenting opinions on the matter, the Commission nevertheless felt that,
"where the attack takes place within the territory of a state, including its
territorial sea, the general rule should be applied that it is a matter for
the State affected to take the necessary measures for the repression of the
acts committed within its territory."146
The Commission also acknowledged that aircraft could commit acts of piracy.
Finally, it concluded that acts committed on board a vessel by the crew or
passengers and directed against the vessel itself, or against the persons or
property on the vessel are not acts of piracy. The Commission's rationale
here was that this view, "tallies with the opinions of most writers".147
ADDITIONAL DRAFT ARTICLES
The Commission developed additional articles which provided for, inter alia:
the assimilation of acts of piracy committed by a warship whose crew has
mutinied to acts of piracy committed by private vessels (Article 15); the
definition of a pirate ship (Article 16); the retention of the nat ional
character of a vessel or aircraft even though it has become a pirate vessel
(Article 17); the seizure of pirate vessels on the high seas or places not
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within the territorial jurisdiction of another state (Article 18); the
liability for damages to the flag state of a vessel detained by another
state's vessel on suspicion of piracy, when that suspicion is unfounded
(Article 19); the restriction of the right to seizure to warships and military
aircraft (Article 20); and the rules for the rights of visit on the high seas
and the circumstances appertaining thereto (Article 21).
THE ULTIMATE RESULT: TODAY'S CONVENTIONAL PIRACY ARTICLES
The Commission's draft and commentary were distributed to the various
governments, and following several additional rounds of discussion, a report
to the General Assemb1y148 was made which incorporated the revisions
suggested during the discussions.
POLICY STATEMENT
The original policy statement, Article 13, was amended at the urging of the
Greek delegate to include the phrase, "or in any other place outside the
jurisdiction of any State", to cover the case of piracy on desert
islands. 1 49 It was adopted without change as Article 14 of the High Seas
Convention:
All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place
outside the jurisdiction of any State.
This provision was transferred verbatim as Article 100, duty to co-operate in
the repression of piracy, to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
THE HIGH SEAS CONVENTION'S DEFINITION OF PIRACY
In debate over the definitional article, the Czech, Jaros1av Zourek, made a
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final appeal to consider the acts of violence and depredation referred to in
Article 14 as acts of piracy even when committed for political ends by
warships or military aircraft, from the high seas against ships, persons, or
goods situated in territorial waters, or against the land. ISO In
retrospect, one can appreciate the utility that a definition of this breadth
could provide in terms of applying piracy doctrine in the context of maritime
terrorism as defined by the Achille Lauro incident, however Zourek's
recommendation was not adopted by the drafting committee. Hence the
Commission's definitional article became Article 15 in the High Seas
Convention:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or
against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place
outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship
or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship
or aircraft;
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act
described in sub-paragraph (1) or sub-paragraph (2) of this
article.
This Article became Article 101 in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
PIRACY BY A WARSHIP OR GOVERNMENT SHIP WHOSE CREW HAS MUTINIED
Article IS of the Commission's draft assimilated acts against third country
vessels whose crews had mutinied to acts of pirate ships. After comments by
the Netherlands government relative to the status of state owned non
commercial vessels which were not warships, lSI drafting changes were made
and this article became Article 16 in the High Seas Convention:
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The acts of piracy, as defined in article 15, committed by a
warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has
mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated
to acts committed by a private ship .
This Article became Article 102 in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
DEFINITION OF A PIRATE SHIP OR AIRCRAFT
Following suggestions from the government of Belgium concerning apparent
time limitations on the right to search and seize suspected pirate vessels on
the high seas inherent in the language of the Commission's original
draft,152 it was reworded and became Article 17 in the High Seas
Convention:
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it
is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the
purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 15.
The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit
any such act, so long as it remains under the control of the
persons guilty of that act.
This Article became Article 103 in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
RETENTION OR LOSS OF NATIONALITY OF A PIRATE SHIP OR AIRCRAFT
The Commission's view that retention or loss of national character of
vessels is determined by the law of the State from which it was originally
derived, Article 17, was accepted without debate, and became Article 18 in the
High Seas Convention:
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has
become a pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of
nationality is determined by the law of the State from which such
nationality was derived.
This Article became Article 104 i n the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
SEIZURE OF A PIRATE SHIP OR AIRCRAFT
Article 18 in the Commission's draft dealt with the seizure and disposition
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of pirate vessels and aircraft and the property therein. After minor drafting
corrections recommended by the Mexican delegate to clear up any confusion
surrounding the question of property on pirate vessels,153 it became
Article 19 in the High Seas Convention :
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction
of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or
a ship taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and
arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of
the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the
penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be
taken with regard to ships, aircraft or property, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith.
This Article became Article 105 in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
DEFINITION AND JURISDICTION: THE TROUBLESOME REFERENCE TO "HIGH SEAS"
Articles 15 and 19 of the High Seas Convention (Articles 101 and 105
respectively in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention) provide the most
troublesome aspects of the conventional law today: the use of the term "high
seas" to define the nature of the offense and the jurisdictional limits
pertaining thereto. As observed in the introduction, jurisdictional concepts
introduced in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, notably the EEZ, have had a
profound impact on the areal extent of what is now considered "high seas." To
the degree that the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention may be considered
declarative on the matt~r of EEZs, in effect the "high seas" now begin 200
miles from the territorial sea baseline of the littoral state (Article 57,
1982 Law of the Sea Convention). In tOday's world, few incidences of piratic
attack occur more than 200 miles from any coast. 1 54
Assuming, arguendo, that pursuant to Article 58 of the 1982 Law of the Sea
Convention the piracy provisions are applicable in the EEZ, the geographic
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scope of universal jurisdiction over piracy has nonetheless been reduced by
other provisions in the Convention. The twelve mile territorial sea (Part II,
Article 3) and archipelagic states concept (Part V, Articles 46-54) have
significantly reduced the geographic extent of the "high seas." As noted,
many piratic attacks today are taking place within twelve miles of coastal
states, or within archipelagic waters. Absent the "high seas" element of the
offense, the universal jurisdiction accorded to "any state" to pursue and
capture pirates is supplanted by coastal state jurisdiction in the territorial
sea or archipelagic waters. This has caused problems because many states lack
the economic or technical resources to mount an effective anti-piracy
enforcement program in the waters under their jurisdiction.
LIABILITY FOR SEIZURE WITHOUT ADEQUATE GROUNDS
Liability for the unauthorized seizure of vessels suspected of piracy was
the subject of draft Article 19. Comments received from the Norwegian and
Netherlands delegations cited some language inconsistencies with respect to
subsequent provisions in the "Right to Visit" clause included elsewhere in the
draft. 1 SS Following the necessary amendments, this Article appeared as
Article 20 in the High Seas Convention:
Where the seizure -of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has
been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the
seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is
possessed by the ship or aircraft, for any loss or damage caused
by the seizure.
This Article became Article 106 in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
SEIZURES ON ACCOUNT OF PIRACY
The Commission addressed the issue of the right of stoppage, i.e., the
authority to stop, investigate, and if appropriate, seize vessels suspected of
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piracy, in draft Article 20. In debate over the scope of the right of
stoppage, authority for which was specifically reserved to warships, the
Government of the Union of South Africa recommended including the stipulation
that if a vessel is attacked by a pirate, but repulses the attack, it may
seize the pirate vessel pending the arrival of a warship. The French delegate,
Mr. Scelle, opined that the draft text in its present form exceeded the rules
of municipal law concerning legitimate self defense, since it allowed a vessel
which had repulsed a pirate attack to exercise provisionally the police powers
of a warship. However, he ultimately accepted the Special Rapporteur's theory
that in the absence of public authorities, their functions could be discharged
by someone else who was in a position to do so.156 While the wording of
draft Article 20 was retained as originally proposed, a statement was placed
in the official commentary indicating that "seizure" within the meaning of
this article did not apply in the case of a merchant vessel, while in the
course of exercising its legitimate right of self defense, captures the pirate
vessel, and subsequently hands it over to a warship or authorities of the
coastal state. 15 7 Thus, this article became Article 21 in the High Seas
Convention:
A seizure on account of piracy may only be carried out by warships
or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft on government
service authorized to that effect.
Minor changes were made to this clause when it appeared as Article 107 in the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention:
A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or
military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and




The Commission's final piracy draft article, number 21, concerned the right
of visit; this dealt with the conditions which justify the boarding of
merchant vessels by warships or government vessels. In commenting on this
Article,lS8 the Commission acknowledged that international law provided
certain exceptions to the principle that merchant vessels could be boarded on
the high seas only by warships flying the same flag. The exceptions included
situations where there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the vessel is
engaged in piracy, or that the vessel is engaged in the slave trade.
Concerning the latter case, the right to visit derived from treaties for the
repression of the slave trade, such as the Brussels Act of 1890, which
assimilated slavery to piracy. However, these treaties limited their
application to narrowly prescribed maritime zones which were regarded as
suspect in connection with the slave trade. The ILC article specifically
limited the right to visit based upon suspected involvement in the slave trade
to those geographic regions specified in international treaties, however this
restrictive wording was absent in the relevant High Seas Convention provision,
Article 22:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred
by treaty, a warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on
the high seas is not justified in boarding her unless there is
reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its
flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the
warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)
above, the warship may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly
its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the command of an
officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the
documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further
examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all
63
possible consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the
ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall
be compensated for any loss or damage that may be sustained.
The 1982 Law of the Sea convention version of this provision, Article 110,
is essentially similar, having been modified slightly to corne into conformity
with other aspects of the convention which have evolved since 1958, thus:
1. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred
by treaty, a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign
ship, other than a ship entitled to complete immunity in
accordance with articles 95 and 96, is not justified in boarding
it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag
state has jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag,
the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship ...
4. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft.
5. These provisions also apply to any other duly authorized ships
or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government
service.
THE CONVENTIONAL LAW IN REVIEW: SETTING THE STAGE FOR FAILURE
The foregoing discussions concerning the evolution of the municipal law on
the subject, and the subsequent efforts at international codification,
illustrate the difficul~y inherent in settling on an acceptable definition in
conventional international law of a concept which has been variously defined
in municipal and customary law on the basis of specific national attitudes,
actions, and intentions. As the concept evolved over the years in the courts,
the elements of the offense were expanded from simple robbery at sea to
include "any illegal acts of violence or depredation"; perpetrators were
defined variously to include, originally, outlaw brigands loyal to no state,
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then unrecognized belligerents and insurgents who attacked uninvolved parties,
and finally, if it served a particular political objective, even sovereign
states themselves. Similarly, the scope of jurisdiction under municipal laws
broadened to authorize police actions on the high seas to protect the nation's
merchant fleet, then at its most extreme, to justify politico-military
adventures against land based groups at the far flung reaches of colonial
empires.
The current international piracy doctrine, as reflected in the 1958 High
Seas Convention (and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention insofar as it parrots
its predecessor's anti-piracy provisions) finds its genesis in the work of the
Harvard Research Group, as modified by the International Law Commission.
Hence, the conception of piracy as defined in the Harvard Research Draft: an
act of violence or depredation on the high seas or terra nullius, carried out
for private ends, by a private ship, beyond the jurisdiction of any State,
against another ship, form the basis of the current conventional anti-piracy
doctrine.
The Harvard Research Draft is noteworthy for its extensive compilation of
jurisprudential commentaries on the scope of piracy jurisdiction and the
definition of the elements of the offense. Unfortunately however, the Harvard
Drafters' acquiescence to the dictates of expediency, particularly with regard
to the public versus private ends debate surrounding belligerent activity, and
their reluctance to extend piracy jurisdiction to single ship incidents, were
flaws which enfeebled those subsequent codification efforts which relied so
heavily upon the Harvard product .
.
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Premised upon a view of the maritime industry and jurisdictional concepts as
they existed in a by-gone era, today's conventional piracy provisions thus
have been rendered ill-equipped to deal with the current security threats
facing today 's international maritime community. The comparatively recent
phenomenon of "maritime terrorism", and the more traditional form of piratic
activity, i.e. violent robbery at sea, now occurring in the vicinity of the
Singapore Strait, both pose unique and difficult problems for a conventional
international law conceptualized prior to the advent of open registry shipping
and the expanding territorial sovereignty of littoral Third World states. The
remaining chapters of this paper will discuss the inadequacies of the
conventional and customary piracy law vis-a'-vis these two troubling
contemporary maritime security issues, and will explore the next generation of
solutions offered to combat these problems.
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CHAPTER v. THE CONVENTIONAL LAW AND MARITIME TERRORISM
THE SANTA MARIA INCIDENT
The Santa Maria incident became the first significant test of the efficacy
of the piracy doctrine enunciated in the 1958 Geneva Convention (although in
fact the Convention was not yet in force at time of the incident) . The
incident is also noteworthy because it may be regarded as ushering in the
modern concept of maritime terrorism. 159 The Santa Maria was a Portuguese
cruise ship which was seized on the high seas by a band of some 71 insurgents,
led by Enrique Galvao, on 22 January 1961. Galvao was a well known opponent
of the Salazar Government of Portugal, and intended the seizing of the vessel
to be the first step in overthrowing Salazar. Galvao and his band boarded the
vessel under the guise of passengers, and during the seizure killed one of the
ship'S officers and wounded eight other crew; the crew and passengers, of
which some 42 were American, became veritable hostages. Galvao claimed to be
representing an international junta of liberals presided over by General
Humberto Delgado, president elect of the Portuguese Republic. In a radio
message to Delgado, Galvao requested that Delgado obtain recognition of an
insurrect ional act and consequently, of a state of belligerence.
The Portuguese government reacted by labelling the insurgents "pirates" and
requested American, British, and Dutch help in recovering the vessel. Galvao
threatened to scuttle the vessel if warships approached. The Santa Maria was
eventually sighted in international waters by British and American naval
vessels, and arrangements were made for RADM Smith of the US Navy to board the
ship outside of Brazilian waters for negotiations. Galvao and his followers
eventually accepted asylum in Brazil, and surrendered the vessel to Brazilian
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authorities, who then returned the vessel to Portugal. After the vessel was
securely anchored in Brazil, the State Department announced that the United
. . 1 1 . t' 160states had acted under the ~nternat~ona aws aga~ns p~racy.
INSURGENCY OR PIRACY?
The incident caused disagreement among commentators as to whether the
seizure constituted piracy. The first issue was whether Galvao's claim of
insurgency placed him outside the scope of the customary law of piracy by
giving him the specialized status of a belligerent. G.C. Fenwick opined in the
negative, claiming the law of insurgency applies to armed conflict between a
group in rebellion and the government in which it is rebelling, and cannot
justify attacks upon civilian lives and property. Galvao's conduct, concluded
Fenwick, was not justified by the law of insurgency, and therefore was
piracy.161 In contrast, L.C. Green argued that the seizure did not
constitute piracy because it was not directed against any interest other than
the Portuguese government. 162
Concerning the conventional law aspects, Green regarded the provision in
Article 15 of the High Seas convention, which requires the action to be
against another ship, as sufficiently disqualifying Galvao from being
considered a pirate. Green further noted "the statements made by Captain
Galvao and General Delgado, made it perfectly clear that this seizure was not
made for private ends.,,163 B.H. Brittin also rejected the piracy concept in
this case on the grounds that Galvao's actions were not private acts. He
reasoned that it was difficult to sustain a private goal in the affair; the
act had tremendous propaganda value and certainly served as a possible
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catalyst for actual revolution. Further, Galvao was negotiated with at length
after being intercepted, and after surrendering was granted political asylum,
prompting Brittin to comment that: "No 'pirate' had ever been treated in such
a gentlemanly way.,,164 The conclusion to be drawn then is that Galvao's
actions were for a public end.
As noted, Galvao ultimately received asylum in Brazil,165 thus rendering
the piracy question academic. Nonetheless, the Santa Maria incident aptly
illustrates how the "two ship" criteria and the "private ends" criteria
embodied in the present conventional law definitions of piracy can restrict
the degree of international response to situations involving insurgent
passengers on the high seas, when the jurisdictional authority of the
international community is based upon existing conventional piracy doctrine.
THE ACHILLE LAURO INCIDENT1 66
On the morning of 7 October 1985, four Palestinians hijacked the Italian
cruise liner Achille Lauro on the high seas some 30 miles from Port Said,
Egypt, and held the crew and passengers hostage. At the time there were 97
passengers on board, including twelve Americans. The hijackers, who boarded
the vessel in Genoa posfng as legitimate passengers, demanded the release of
fifty Palestinians being held in Israeli jails. They threatened to blow up
the ship if intervention was attempted, and to start to kill the passengers if
their demands were not met. Following unsuccessful negotiations, the
hijackers made good on their threat, and killed a crippled American passenger,
Leon Klinghoffer, and threw his body overboard. After being denied entry to
Cyprus, the Palestinians sailed back to Port Said, where having negotiated
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safe passage from Egypt, they surrendered to Egyptian officials. The
Egyptians, who disclaimed any knowledge of the killing, promised safe passage
to the Palestinians, and refused to detain, try, or extradite them. President
Reagan ordered U.S. forces to intercept the plane carrying the palestinians,
and on the evening of 10 October 1985, four Navy jets diverted the plane from
its course and forced it to land at a US-Italian NATO base in Sicily. The
Italians took custody of the Palestinians and subsequently charged them for
offenses related to the hijacking of the ship and the death of Mr .
Klinghoffer. However, they refused a request from the United States for the
Palestinians extradition.
The U.S. had issued an arrest warrant, charging hostage taking, piracy on
the high seas, and conspiracy (murder was not included, there being no federal
law making the killing of an American, beyond U.S. territorial jurisdiction,
illegal at the time167) under applicable U.S. laws. The charge of piracy
on the high seas is difficult to substantiate. The piracy charge under U.S.
law, 18 USc 1651, is based on the concept of piracy jure gentium, and reads:
"Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law
of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States,
shall be imprisoned for -l i f e . " The arrest warrant for the Palestinians
specifically charged them with piracy under the law of nations, alleging that
they had without any legitimate authority seized control of the Achille Lauro
by use and threat of violence, and that they had done so for private
ends. 168
As recalled from the earlier discussion of the Smith case, American
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municipal law on the matter turns on the international definition of piracy.
Unfortunately, applying the international definitions, as articulated in the
1958 High Seas convention, the applicable conventional law insofar as the US
was concerned, or the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, if the piracy provisions
therein may be regarded as being declarative on the matter, the Palestinians
actions do not qualify as piracy. First, since their actions were confined
solely to the Achille Lauro, the requirement of 'another ship' is lacking.
Secondly, although the warrant alleged that the Palestinians acted for private
ends, it is difficult to accept that the actions of the Palestinians in this
case were devoid of any public or political character.
PIRACY AND POLITICAL ACTS UNDER THE CONVENTIONAL LAW
There has, however, been considerable difference of opinion among
commentators over whether the seizure of a ship on the high seas for a
political cause constitutes piracy under the High Seas Convention. It will be
recalled from the previous analysis of the travaux preparatoires that
distinguishing private from political ends was one of the controversial points
debated during the development of the ILC's definitional article. The Soviet
delegate S.B. Krylov recommended that the original statement in the
definitional article: "Acts committed for political ends cannot be regarded as
piratical acts", be deleted because "it was impossible to establish a
criterion to distinguish acts committed for private ends and acts committed
for political ends. ,,169 This recommendation was accepted by the
Commission. The British delegate, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, went as far as
suggesting the need to find a better expression than "for private ends". He
argued that "the real antithesis which needed to be brought out was between
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authorized and unauthorized acts and acts committed in a public or private
capacity. An act committed in a private capacity could have a political
purpose but be unauthorized-as for example the seizure of a vessel by a member
of an opposition party.,,170
Thus Professor Halberstam suggests that the definitions of piracy in the
High Seas Convention and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention were not intended
to exclude indiscriminate attacks by terrorists:
"Although "for private ends" can certainly be interpreted as
excluding any acts that have a political purpose and there is
language in the travaux preparatoires contrasting "private ends"
with "political ends," it appears fairly clear that the term
"political ends" was used to refer to acts by "a revolutionary
organization that had not been recognized as a belligerent by the
offended state". Thus one may reasonably take the position, based
on an analysis of the travaux preparatoires, that "for private
ends" was only intended to exclude acts by insurgents who had not
yet achieved the status of belligerents (but whose acts would be
lawful if done by belligerents), and acts by state vessels that
had been authorized by a state and for which that state assumed
responsibility.,,17l [citations omitted]
Constantinople distinguishes the Santa Maria case from the Achille Lauro
incident, and would exempt the former case because it involved the seizure of
a ship belonging to an opposition state by persons who confined their actions
to that state. Conversely, in the Achille Lauro incident, the perpetrators
seized a ship of a third state and held hostage and killed citizens of another
third state, and this type of incident should be within the purview of piracy.
constantinople called for a modernized definition of piracy which would
distinguish between acts done for public ends as legitimate (nonpiratical) or
illegitimate (piratical) on the basis of action and not on the basis of
status. 17 2 In his view acts done for public ends, which otherwise meet the
definition of piracy, if directed towards the ships, property, or nationals of
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a third state neutral to an internal conflict, should be considered piratical.
A tortuous academic dissection of the travaux preparatoires may give limited
support to the proposition that existing conventional piracy law did not
intend to proscribe universal jurisdiction against indiscriminate acts of
maritime terrorism on the high seas (though a much stronger case could be made
on the basis of customary piracy law). However, other conventional aspects,
notably the two ship rule and jurisdictional constraints, severely limit the
ability of the existing conventional law to address the growing threat that
organized insurgents, national liberation organizations, or individuals pose
to the maritime community.173
THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: THE IHO CONVENTION ON MARITIME SAFETY
While the seizure of the Achille Lauro and the connected crimes were
described in the press and by the United states government as piracy on the
high seas, the definitional shortcomings found in the High Seas Convention and
1982 Law of the Sea Convention's piracy provisions as applied to maritime
terrorism were well recognized by the international community.l74 This
incident ultimately led to a resolution on terrorism by the U.N. General
Assembly which requested the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to
"study the problem of terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making
recommendations on appropriate measures. "l75 Italy, later joined by
Austria and Egypt, proposed a draft convention against maritime terrorism
modeled on existing conventions, notably the Hague and Montreal Conventions
against airplane hijacking and sabotage,176 and the Hostage
Convention. 177 This draft was submitted to the IMO. The comparatively
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short period of time involved in the development of this convention1 78 has
been attributed to the decision of the IMO council to establish an Ad Hoc
Preparatory Committee open to all states, which "encouraged the formation of
delegations with a broad range of expertise in a variety of legal fields,
including in many cases experience of negotiating "prosecute or extradite"
conventions. ,,179 This avoided delays which might have accrued had the
matter been submitted to the IMO's overburdened Legal Committee, which
ordinarily would have considered the matter. 18 0 In the opinion of one IMO
Committee member:
"The fact of negotiation taking place within the auspices of the
IMO had some impact on the content of the texts themselves,
notably in the inclusion of the standard IMO provision for a
review conference ••• Its greatest impact, however, was in relation
to the political aspects of the negotiations. The IMO is a small,
specialized agency of the UN system. It seeks to avoid the
alignment of delegations along the lines of political blocs or
groupings present in many other inter-governmental organisations
and nurtures an "IMO spirit", which exhorts delegations to an
efficient, practical approach to tasks, not generally consistent
with the introduction of extraneous political
considerations. ,,181
A Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (together with an optional Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental
Shelf)182 was adopted and opened for signature in Rome between 1 and 10
March 1988. While a detailed analysis of this Convention will not be
undertaken here, a brief look at the improvements that this Convention
provides over the piracy articles of the High Seas Convention and 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention relative to maritime terrorism is appropriate.
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THE -SECTORIAL APPROACH-
In contradistinction to its High Seas and Law of the Sea predecessors, the
Rome Convention does not try to include unlawful acts against the safety of
navigation within the notion of international piracy. It adopts instead what
has been described as the "sectorial approach" characteristic of previous
international efforts against terrorism applied in the context of safety of
air navigation, internationally protected persons, and hostage taking. 18 3
Rather than attempting to develop an all encompassing instrument which would
be generally acceptable to all parties yet effective in achieving its intended
objectives, the sectorial approach identifies particular offenses which belong
to the activities of terrorists, and works out specific international
instruments for their suppression. Therefore by targeting specific offenses,
ideological and political aspects of international terrorism can be minimized,
and a network of international obligations addressing the most alarming
manifestations of international terrorism can be constructed. 18 4
Interestingly, while the term "Suppression" figures prominently in the title
of the Convention, the operative provisions of the instrument are concerned
more with the apprehension, conviction, and punishment of the offenders,
rather than measures for- suppression, which are stated in Article 13 as:
(a) taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations in
their respective territories for the commission of those offenses
within or outside their territories;
(b) exchanging information in accordance with their national law,
and coordinating administrative and other measures taken as
appropriate to prevent the commission of offenses set forth in
article 3.
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THE FOCUS OF THE ROME CONVENTION: PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE
The 1988 Rome Convention did not attempt to modify the definition of
"piracy" found in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention by eliminating the
private/public acts conundrum, which as a result might have presumably imputed
a universal jurisdiction for any state to engage maritime terrorists
irrespective of its connection with the crime. The Rome Convention instead
adopted the model found in air terrorism conventions: the principle of aut
dedere aut iudicare, or "prosecute or extradite." Here the obligation of each
state party to the Convention in which an offender is found is either to
extradite the offender to one of the states which has jurisdiction under the
convention, or submit the case to its own authorities for prosecution.
Additional provisions regarding measures for cooperation between states
parties to the Convention in preventing the offenses identified in the
convention, as well as in connection with the criminal proceedings resulting
therefrom, complement the prosecute or extradite rules.
THE SPECIFIC OFFENSES DEFINED
The specific offenses covered by the Convention are detailed in Article 3
and substantially reproduce mutatis mutandis the offenses provided for in the
Hague and Montreal aviation related Conventions, vis:
1. Any person commits an offense if that person unlawfully and
intentionally:
(a) seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat
thereof or any other form of intimidation; or
(b) performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship
if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that
ship; or
(c) destroys a ship or causes damage to a ship or to its cargo
which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(d) places or causes to be placed on a ship, by any means
whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that
ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or
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is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or
(e) destroys or seriously damages maritime navigational
facilities or seriously interferes with their operation, if any
such act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of a ship; or
(f) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby
endangering the safe navigation of a ship; or
(g) injures or kills any person, in connection with the commission
or the attempted commission of any of the offenses set forth in
subparagraphs (a) to (f).
2. Any person also commits an offense if that person:
(a) attempts to commit any of the offenses set forth in paragraph
1; or
(b) abets the commission of any of the offenses set forth in
paragraph 1 perpetrated by any person or is otherwise an
accomplice of a person who commits such an offense; or
(c) threatens, with or without a condition, as is provided for
under national law, aimed at compelling a physical or juridical
person to do or refrain from doing any act, to commit any of the
offenses set forth in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b), (c), and
(e), if that threat · is likely to endanger the safe navigation of
the ship in question.
Unlike the Hague and Montreal Conventions which do not make it an offense to
injure or kill a person, 185 the Rome Convention specifically denominates
this as one of the principal offenses. This provision was inserted largely at
the insistence of the united states, and was no doubt directly linked to the
killing of Leon Klinghoffer during the Achille Lauro affair. 1 8 6 The degree
to which there must be a connection between the killing or injury and the
commission or attempted commission of the other specified acts is SUbject to
interpretation, but it has been suggested that no clearer wording could be
found. 187 Nevertheless, as Professor Halberstam, the head of the us
delegation has pointed out, it was important to include this provision in the
Convention because otherwise it would make it difficult to prosecute the
offenders for such a killing. She notes that while it presumably would be an
offense under the law of the flag state even if not included as a separate
offense under this Convention,
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" ••• the flag state would not be entitled to extradition of the
offender for murder under the Convention. The extradite or
prosecute provision of the Convention applies to "offenses" under
the Convention. The inclusion of murder as an aggravating
circumstance, rather than as an "offense," would therefore not
provide a basis for extradition for murder. Furthermore, if the
offender were extradited to the flag state for other offenses
under the Convention, that state would not have jurisdiction to
try him for the murder, since under the laws of extradition a
state may generally not try a person for any offenses other than
those for which he was extradited. " [citation omitted]188
THE IMPROVED GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE OF THE ROME CONVENTION
As recalled from the discussion at the beginning of this paper, the
introduction of the EEZ in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention has had a
profound effect upon littoral states' sovereign rights. Piracy enforcement
has been complicated by this development. As Professor Birnie has suggested,
"coastal states may consider that as the [EEZ's] purpose is to
secure their exclusive right to its economic uses and as its legal
status is arguably left sui generis by the wording of [the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention] since it is not clearly stated to be
part of the high seas, it is their responsibility to protect
navigation from piratical assaults.,,189
As a practical matter, because the areal extent of the "high seas" has
diminished under the impact of the EEZ, only about 15 percent of recent
incidents of violence at sea were within the geographic scope of piracy jure
gentium. 190
The geographic scope provision of the Rome Convention, Article 4,
incorporates a "positive approach", L e., it lists the circumstances in which
the Convention applies, rather than where it does not apply. By providing
jurisdictional authority to states whose vessels have come under piratic
attack in virtually any waters, the Rome Convention greatly improves upon the
geographic coverage provided in previous conventional piracy provisions which
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rely on the now increasingly inappropriate "high seas" concept. Thus:
1. This Convention applies if the ship is navigating or is
scheduled to navigate into, through or from waters beyond the
outer limits of the territorial sea of a single State, or the
lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States.
2. In cases where the Convention does not apply pursuant to
paragraph 1, it nevertheless applies when the offender or the
alleged offender is found in the territory of a State party other
than the State referred to in paragraph 1.
The delegates' intent here was to ensure that the concept of
internationality was maintained irrespective of the physical location of the
vessel. To do this, the geographical elements in the Convention are described
in terms of the actual or scheduled location of the ship, as opposed to the
geographic location of the offense. Thus the international elements triggering
the Convention are: the actual navigation of a ship, whether voluntary or not;
in internal waters; the territorial sea; or beyond the territorial sea so long
as the ship is coming from or is headed towards (or is scheduled to head
towards) a point outside the territorial sea of a single State. In the event
these criteria are not met, the Convention still applies if the offender is
found abroad.
Several debates were held regarding the desired applicability of this
Convention to the cabotage trade, with the decision being made to exclude from
the Convention coasting occurring entirely within the internal waters of a
state by a ship flying the flag of a different state, though the provisions of
paragraph 2 would still be applicable. The words "into, through, or from"
were carefully crafted to ensure that ships such as oil tankers, which may
only visit offshore terminals and therefore do not cross the outer limits of
the territorial sea, were included in the jurisdictional scope of this
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convention.
APPLICABILITY TO INTERNATIONAL STRAITS
A number of Arab delegations, led by Saudi Arabia, insisted on including a
provision which dealt specifically with international straits, though the
wording in the Convention imputed application in all instances of straits
navigation which had an international element . 19 1 However, Spain, in
particular, was concerned that the Convention could result in a diminution of
coastal state sovereignty in situations where navigation occurred in an
international strait, though the ship never crossed (nor was scheduled to
cross) the outer limit of the territorial sea. Navigation between the Spanish
ports of Algeciras, west of the Strait of Gibraltar, and Malaga, on the east
of the Strait, was provided as an example. To secure general agreement to
Article 4, the United Kingdom proposed not mentioning international straits in
the Convention itself, but instead included in the Final Act the following
explanatory paragraph:
23. In relation to Article 4 of the [Convention], some delegations
were in favour of the inclusion in Article 4, paragraph 1, of
straits used for international navigation. Other delegations
pointed out that it was unnecessary to include them since
navigation in straits was one of the situations envisaged in
Article 4, paragraph 1. Therefore, the Convention will apply in
straits used for international navigation, without prejudice to
the legal status of the waters forming such straits in accordance
with relevant conventions and other rules of international
law. 1 9 2
Since this paragraph merely confirms what was obvious from the beginning,
i.e. that navigation in international straits is covered by the Convention if
an international element is included, the utility of the paragraph, if any at
all, may rest with its use as an interpretive aid in accordance with Article
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32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 19 3
ESTABLISHING JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional provision, Article 6, is the other aspect relevant to
this study. Article 6 establishes two types of jurisdiction, obligatory and
discretionary, vis:
1. Each state Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in
Article 3 when the offense is committed:
(a) against or aboard a ship flying the flag of the State at the
time the offense is committed; or
(b) in the territory of that State, including its territorial
sea; or
(c) by a national of that state.
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such
offense when;
(a) it is committed by a stateless person whose habitual
residence is in that State; or
(b) during its commission a national of that state is seized,
threatened, injured, or killed; or
(c) it is committed in an attempt to compel that state to do or
abstain from doing any act ••.
4. Each state Party shall take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over the offenses set forth in
article 3 in cases where the alleged offender is present in its
territory and it does not extradite him to any of the State
Parties which have established their jurisdiction in accordance
with paragraphs land 2 of this article ...
While based closely on Article 5 of the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, the Rome Convention provides more grounds for establishing
jurisdiction, especially with respect to its discretionary provisions. The
Rome Convention recognizes that the most widely accepted bases of jurisdiction
under international law, nationality and territoriality (and as for ships, the
flag state), can be inadequate to establish effective standing in the context
of maritime terrorism on the high seas. For example, in terrorist cases, the
offender's national state may be reluctant to prosecute, and indeed could even
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approve of the act. Further, in this era of open registry shipping, the flag
state may not have the political or economic wherewithal to undertake an
effective prosecution. Thus the Convention, in its discretionary provisions,
adopts the protective principle and passive personality principle.
THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE AND PASSIVE PERSONALITY PRINCIPLE
Briefly, the protective principle provides that a state has a right to
prosecute those persons who threaten its governmental functions
(counterfeiting is frequently cited as an example) regardless of the
nationality of the offender or the geographic location of the offense. l 9 4
The rationale behind the protective principle can easily be applied to
situations involving threats to a state's nationals or property when such
threats are based on a third party's attempts to coerce the target government
to do, or refrain from doing some act. The passive personality principle
accords extraterritorial jurisdiction to a State when its nationals are
victims of crimes committed abroad. l 95
The adoption in this Convention of the passive personality and protective
principles, i.e. jurisdiction for the State of nationality of the victim, and
-by the targeted State, are particularly significant for the United States. As
Professor Halberstam observed, "the United States is unlikely to be the state
of nationality of the offender and not very likely to be the flag state, but
has already been and will unfortunately probably continue to be the state of
nationality of the victim and one of the states whose conduct terrorists seek
to affect by their attacks."l96
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THE ROME CONVENTION EVALUATED
Because of its essentially public and political character, maritime
terrorism is distinguished from "traditional" piracy, which is committed for
private purposes. Developed in the wake of the Achille Lauro affair, the Rome
Convention has eliminated the two ship and private ends tests which heretofore
rendered the previous conventional international piracy law inapplicable in
the context of maritime terrorism. At the same time the Convention maintains a
near "universal jurisdiction" evocative of that customarily ascribed to piracy
through the application of the passive personality and protective principles,
as well as the more customary jurisdictional bases of nationality and
territoriality. As a result, the Rome Convention provides a substantial
improvement to the international community's legal arsenal against maritime
terrorism.
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CHAPTER VI. "TRADITIONAL" PIRACY IN THE SINGAPORE STRAIT
Incidents such as the Achille Lauro affair and the July 1988 attack upon the
tourist ferry City of Poros in the Gulf of Aegina represent only the most
recent manifestations of maritime violence. The maritime menace which most
closely conforms to the general public's commonly held notions of piracy, i.e.
violent robbery at sea, continues to flourish in selected geographic regions
of the globe. Perhaps the most insidious example is in the Straits of Malacca
and Singapore, which have been the site of some 200 instances of pirate
attacks last year. 19 7
This region is especially pertinent for examination because the once
relevant concept of universal jurisdiction over piracy on the high seas has
become increasingly inappropriate to the actual piratic circumstances
occurring in these waters today. While the methodology and appearance of the
criminals plying these waters may well harken back to the eighteenth century
freebooter image of piracy, today's enforcement strategies must contend with
maritime geopolitical developments, e.g. expanded territorial seas,
archipelagic waters concepts, EEZs, and increased coastal state sensitivity to
intrusions on their sovereignty by former colonial powers, which were totally
alien in the era of Blackbeard and Captain Kidd. And as will be discussed,
failure to develop an effective response to the piracy menace in this region
may have consequences of a severity equally unimaginable in a previous era.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MALACCA AND SINGAPORE STRAITS
Piratic activity has long been associated with the Strait of Malacca (map
1). The region first attained its historical prominence in the fifth century
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by providing Arab traders with a marine corridor between the Indian Ocean and
the southeast coast of Sumatra. The significance of the singapore Strait as a
link between the Bay of Bengal and China was to come centuries later.
European influence arrived first with the Dutch and Portuguese in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, with the British achieving
political and economic primacy in the region following the Treaty of London of
1824, which, inter alia, confirmed the British acquisition of singapore. By
the late 1950s these Straits had become a particularly important route in the
world petroleum market, as ever increasing amounts of crude oil from the
Persian Gulf (and by the late 1970s, liquefied natural gas, [LNG] from
sumatra) were carried by tankers to Japan. The strategic importance of this
waterway to the Japanese can not be underestimated since by the end of the
1970s more than 80 percent of Japan's crude oil originated in the Persian
Gulf. 198 As the economies of the so called "Four Tigers": singapore,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Thailand, have grown in the eighties, there has been a
corresponding increase in the region's container traffic. Resultantly, in 1991
the Port of Singapore became the world's busiest container port. 19 9
THE STRAITS TODAY: TRAFFIC DENSITY AND GEOGRAPHY
Today the strait of Malacca and the Singapore Strait are arguably the most
important commercial waterways in the world. Connecting the Indian Ocean on
the west to the South China Sea on the east, the area attracts the heaviest
concentration of merchant shipping in the world. Nearly 200 vessels over 1000
gross tons (excluding fishing vessels and military ships) transit these
Straits on a daily basis. 200 In addition to the moving traffic, at any
given time, hundreds of vessels are laying by in the two major anchorage areas
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off of Singapore, awaiting berths, receiving supplies, bunkering, or making
repairs.
The abundance and density of maritime traffic in the region are not the only
factors in the piracy equation; geography and economics also play vital roles.
The western end of the Ma1acca Strait is quite spacious as the coasts of
Indonesia to the southwest and Malaysia to the northeast are separated by some
200 miles (map 2). The Straits narrow appreciably as one moves in a
southeasterly direction towards Singapore. At approximate latitude 3 degrees
N, just below One Fathom Bank, the territorial waters of Indonesia and
Malaysia begin to overlap (map 3). At the southwestern tip of the Malay
Peninsula the Straits of Malacca are at their narrowest, 8.4 nautical miles,
though the actual navigable channel for deep draft vessels is very much less
(map 4). It is about this point that the Malacca Strait merges with the
Singapore Strait, which proceeds for a length of about seventy miles eastward
to the South China Sea. The Singapore Strait is bounded on the north by the
Malay Peninsula and Singapore Island and to the south by the Indonesian
islands of Batam and Bintan, the largest islands in the Riau Group (map 5).
The navigable channel at the western end of the Singapore Strait is about 7.5
miles in width, though on its eastward course the navigable channel narrows to
a minimum of 1.5 miles, with the narrowest land width being 3.2 miles. At its
western extremity, the Singapore Strait is joined by the Durian Strait, which
is the route to and from the Sunda Strait, and the Phillip Channel, the latter
joining the Singapore Strait south of Raffles light. The Phillip Channel,
located ent i r ely wit h i n Indonesian territorial waters, is, pursuant to an IMCO
(now IMO) approved traffic separation scheme implemented in 1977,201 the
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required passage for large deep draft vessels proceeding eastward.
THE PHILLIP CHANBEL: OPPORTUNITY, MOTIVES, AND METHODOLOGY
It is in the reef and island strewn Phillip Channel that the majority of
pirate attacks have occurred. 20 2 As Captain Henry Keppel, the famed pirate
hunter of the Serhassan case observed nearly 150 years ago: "As surely as
spiders abound where there are nooks and crannies, so have pirates sprung up
wherever there is a nest of islands offering creeks and shallows, headlands,
rock and reefs-facilities in short for lurking, for surprise, for attack, for
escape. "203 The islands of the Riau Group are densely vegetated with many
narrow passages and reefs which provide excellent hiding places, and the
indigenous population of fishermen affords a desirable measure of anonymity to
the pirates, who can thus operate in an environment of relative safety. Laden
oil tankers, their freeboards low and their speed reduced to the minimum
revolutions necessary to maintain adequate steerage in this densely trafficked
narrow channel, present the most inviting targets of opportunity.204 The
pirates usually approach under cover of darkness in speed boats or in
ubiquitous native fishing craft, and easily ascend the vessel by a grappling
hook tossed over the stern railing. Once aboard, the pirates, typically
operating in groups of two to five men, armed with axes, knives, and with
disturbing frequency now, small arms and automatic weapons, seize the vessel's
master, and force him to open the ship's safe which usually contains
substantial amounts of cash. 20 5 Cash and valuables have been the principal
booty in attacks that are completed usually in fifteen minutes or so by
boarders who have been described by the victims as "quiet, swift, serious, and
professional. "206
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Inasmuch as traffic density and geography provide .the opportunity for
prospective pirates, the economic conditions of the area provide ample motive.
Singapore, a tiny nation of some 240 square miles with population of 2.6
million, enjoys the highest standard of living among ASEAN nations. 20 7 It
has highly trained and efficient defense and police forces which have done a
creditable job in curbing piracy in its own territorial waters. In contrast,
its southern neighbor Indonesia is an archepelagic nation of some 13,677
islands which stretch nearly 3200 miles from the Indian Ocean to the Arafura
Sea. It is the world's fifth most populous nation, but enjoys an annual per
capita income of only US$430. 208 Most of the Indonesians in the Riau region
exist at a subsistence level. Given the sparse military and law enforcement
capability in the region (the Indonesian naval base at Tanjung Pinang on
Bintan Island reportedly had only two patrol craft policing the area),209
there is every incentive for enterprising young Indonesians to take advantage
of the profitable opportunities provided by an endless supply of vulnerable
steel cash cows navigating slowly through their waters. 2 10
THE PHILLIP CHANNEL: THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE
The most problematic aspect of piracy in this area is of course the
jurisdictional issue. Indiscriminant attacks are being made on the world's
commercial vessels exercising their rights of transit passage through an
international strait which lies wholly within the territorial waters of a
single nation. The conventional definitions of piracy mandate its locus "on
the high seas", and, it will be recalled, a state's duty to cooperate in
piracy repression is limited to those acts occurring on the high seas or in
any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state. 2 l l What options
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are available to the international community to remedy a situation which poses
an international maritime menace, when the littoral state in whose waters the
menace is located can not or will not take action?
THE CORFU CHANNEL CASE: OBLIGATIONS OF THE LITTORAL STATE
The 1949 Corfu Channel case2 l 2 points to some principles which may be
relevant to the instant situation. Shortly after the conclusion of the Second
World War, the British were engaged in mine clearing operations in the Strait
of Corfu, located between the Greek island of Corfu and the mainland shores of
Greece and Albania. British vessels initially cleared the strait of mines, but
on a later transit, two British vessels were damaged by mines located in
Albanian territorial waters. Britain alleged that either the mines had been
laid by Albania following the initial sweep, or at the minimum, Albania had
been aware of the presence of the mines and had failed to warn the foreign
shipping transiting the straits, thereby violating the right of innocent
passage through an international waterway. In diplomatic correspondence
between Great Britain and Albania, the British government described the
incidents in the Corfu Channel as "deliberate and outrageous" breaches of
international law and maritime custom. 2 13 The British viewed the matter
not just as an incident between the two nations but rather as a matter of
general safety of life at sea, and as such regarded Albania's action as a
"criminal disregard for the safety of innocent seamen of any nationality
lawfully using an international highway.,,214 Britain took the matter to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and in its Memorial to the Court,
classified Albania's action as an "international delinquency" and in the
special circumstances of the case, as "an offense against humanity which most
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seriously aggravates the breach of international law and the international
delinquency committed by that state.,,21S Britain claimed compensation from
Albania for the damages to its vessels, and the loss of life which ensued.
The Court found that Albania had sufficient knowledge of the presence of the
mines in its waters and thus ruled that it had been a duty of the Albanian
government to notify the world in general of the existence of the minefield,
and to specifically warn the British vessels when they were in imminent
danger. citing elementary considerations of humanity and the obligation of
every state not to allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the
rights of other states, the Court affirmed Albanian responsibility under
international law for the mining of the British ships and the subsequent
damage and loss of life involved. Britain was awarded compensation, however
the award was ignored by Albania.
The ruling of the ICJ may have some relevance to the activities occurring
now in the Phillip Channel. The degree to which the ICJ accepted an
international freedom of maritime communication in straits, and thus condemned
a littoral state for allowing its territory to be used for acts contrary to
the rights of other states, suggests some precedential value for applying
Article 44 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (insofar as it may now be
regarded as declarative on the matter) to the situation in the Phillip
Channel. Article 44 denominates the duties of States bordering international
straits, among which are the obligations not to hamper transit passage and to
publicize those dangers to navigation in the straits about which they have
knowledge. Potential piratic attacks may reasonably constitute a legitimate
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navigational hazard for which publicity is appropriate. Of course, the duty
to advise the maritime community about the potential for piratic attack does
not in itself impute a duty to repress piratic activity. However, frequent
and potentially dangerous piratic.attacks could arguably be construed as
conditions hampering transit passage. Further, an interpretation of the
"shall not hamper" clause made in light of the ICJ's implicit condemnation of
"criminal" activity which adversely impacted upon the maritime traffic in an
international waterway, suggests that a failure by the cognizant littoral
state to implement reasonable municipal measures to eliminate piratic activity
could result in the state being held negligent in its international
obligations. Such a state could then be subject to international sanction.
SANCTIONS AND REPARATIONS
International sanctions are of debatable utility, and indeed may be totally
inapplicable to the Singapore Strait situation, given the paucity of
economically suitable alternative navigation routes. Further, Singapore, the
nation wh~h has been the region's most vigorous proponent of the
internationalization of the Straits, and is in the best economic and
technological position to mount an effective anti-piracy program, stands to
lose the most should the international maritime community shy away from the
region.
In an analysis of the possible liability arising from a state's failure to
act against piracy, D.H.N. Johnson interpreted this as, "the payment of
reparation to other states whose shipping was molested by the pirates in
question. ,,216 Unfortunately this provides little practical relief to the
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maritime community. Nations lacking the economic capacity to mount an
effective law enforcement program in their own waters are unlikely to have the
resources to pay reparations, assuming first that they even acknowledge such
an assessment by a cognizant international forum.
NON-JUDICIAL INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
Leaving aside the international judicial remedies, there have been in the
past decade a variety of other international efforts to address the piracy
problem. The IMO, pursuant to Resolution A545(13) adopted on 17 November
1983, urged governments to take, as a matter of highest priority, all measures
necessary to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery against
ships in or adjacent to their waters, including strengthening of security
measures. The resolution also called on governments to report to the IMO all
acts of piracy against ships flying their flag and to inform the Organization
of action taken to implement the resolution. The United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) became involved in the issue in 1982, whereby
it decided to establish an Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Group to consider means of
combating all aspects of maritime fraud, including piracy. The UNCTAD
Committee on Shipping adopted Resolution 60(XII) in November 1986 which, inter
alia, asked the secretariat to monitor work on the development of a training
program to combat maritime fraud. 2 17
The United States' Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) provides a worldwide
service, under the auspices of its Navigation Information Network
(NAVINFONET), known as the Antishipping Activities Messages Subsystem (ASAM).
The product of the U.s. Maritime Administration (MARAn) sponsored Interagency
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Working Group on Piracy and Maritime Terrorism held in March 1985, the ASAM
system is a centralized data base for filing reports of attacks against
shipping worldwide and can be accessed by the maritime community at large.
The system provides for a central location to file the reports of attacks
against shipping, and it also provides warnings within the Automated Notice to
Mariners system to the maritime community of the risks in certain geographical
areas by advising them that they should avoid or approach these areas with due
caution . Similar incident reporting and advisory schemes have been
implemented by the International Chamber of Commerce 's International Maritime
Bureau (IMB), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), and the
International Shipping Federation (ISF).
The primary result of these international measures has been the generation
of reliable statistics concerning the scope of piratic and maritime terrorist
activity occurring throughout the world, and the promulgation of various
shipboard security guidelines and anti-piracy safety measures intended for
ship operators themselves. As such they have been primarily reactive type
measures, rather than proactive enforcement solutions. In the case of the
Singapore Strait, effective enforcement measures have been frustrated by
jurisdictional complications based upon long standing political differences
between the region's littoral states. Since its independence in the months
following the Second World War, Indonesia has been especially sensitive to
intrusions on its territorial sovereignty, and as such was the principal
architect of the archepelagic waters concept embodied in the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention. Malaysia too, joined Indonesia in opposing the
internationalization of the Straits during the Convention's negotiations,
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though it perceived Indonesia's archipelagic waters scheme as a potential
threat to its own freedom of access between its peninsular West and its states
of Sarawak and Sabah on Borneo. Singapore, in contrast, wished to maintain
full freedom for maritime traffic in the Straits, which in large measure is
its economic life blood. Despite these differences however there is an
encouraging precedent for the implementation of an effective regional anti-
piracy program: the 1977 IMCO Resolution on Navigation Through the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore.
THE 1977 IHCO RESOLUTION'
The 1977 IMCO Resolution was based on the Straits states' recognition of the
potentially disastrous environmental consequences which could result from the
uncontrolled navigation of Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) through this
narrow and increasingly congested waterway. Indeed, in November 1971, the
three Straits states, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, issued a joint
statement2 18 whereby they agreed to adopt a common position on matters
relating to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. They concluded that the
safety of navigation in the Straits is the responsibility of the coastal
states concerned, and that a body composed of these three states be
established to coordinate efforts for safety of navigation. The 6 January
1975 grounding of the 244,000 deadweight ton Japanese VLCC Showa Maru in the
vicinity of Buffalo Rock, three miles south of Singapore in Indonesian waters,
resulted in a spill of some 844,000 gallons of crude oil. 2 19 The incident
set the stage for tripartite action, in concert with IMCO, on the development
of a traffic control scheme for the Straits. The IMCO provided both the
technical expertise, and an effective political buffer between the affected
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states, to ensure a workable traffic separation scheme was developed and
implemented. As Professor Leifer has summarized the situation:
"The passage of the traffic separation scheme resolved a major
issue of maritime contention. IMCO's deference to the priorities
and to the authority of the coastal states satisfied the special
concern of Indonesia and Malaysia that their rights would not be
overridden because of international usage of the straits. At the
same time, their evident willingness to accept external (Japanese)
funding for the establishment of aids to navigation in addition to
the expert advice of IMCO provided a measure of assurance to those
maritime states that had an initial sense of apprehension at the
possible consequences of the declaration of November 1971.,,220
The ability of the IMO to remain above the political fray has long been an
attribute which has contributed to the organization's successes, as evidenced
in the development of the Rome Convention previously discussed. It is
suggested that the IMO could provide an equally important role in the
development of an effective regional anti-piracy program, once the Straits
states recognize the economic and environmental consequences that can result
from their failure to mount an effective regional law enforcement effort
against piracy.
AN ENVIRONMENTAL CALL TO ACTION
While the Straits states may have heretofore been able to dismiss the piracy
problem as an economic nuisance not significantly affecting their national
flag shipping or coastal zone interests, such naivete' is fast disappearing.
Recent reports indicate that the latest technique being employed by the
pirates is to divert the crew's attention by starting a fire aboard the target
vessel and then plundering it while the crew's attention is focused upon
fighting the fire. 22 l The potential for an environmental catastrophe is
readily and frighteningly apparent in this scenario, especially given the
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amount of hazardous cargo being transported through the narrow and heavily
trafficked Phillip Channel. Insofar as environmental concerns provided the
impetus for the development of a traffic separation scheme in 1977, so may
they spur coastal state action to eliminate piracy in the region today. In
this regard it is interesting to note that the Indonesian Minister of State
for population and Environment recently raised concerns over the impending
shipment of plutonium from France to Japan through the Straits on the Japanese
ship Akatsuki Maru, urging Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines
to take a united stand against the presence of the vessel in the region. 2 22
Perhaps the best hope for an effective anti-piracy program will be one
developed out of an environmental nexus.
There have been recent i nd i c a t i o n s that the Straits states are beginning to
come to grips with the piracy problem, following prompting from the Hong Kong
Shipowners Association, the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association, and
other commercial organizations. 22 3 An anti-piracy agreement recently
entered into between Singapore and Indonesia addressed the ticklish issue of
hot pursuit by singaporean forces into Indonesian territorial waters, and vice
versa, and will lead to coordinated sea patrols in the Straits. 22 4
Further, Indonesian and Malaysian customs officials planned to employ 56
patrol boats in a joint patrol operation in the Riau area beginning in
September 1992. 22 5 Regardless of the impetus behind the Straits states'
anti-piracy program, these measures may still fall short due to inadequate
personnel training, or insufficient funding and resolve to mount a long term
operation. Therefore, a degree of international participation beyond the
immediate regional states is appropriate.
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IRTERHATIOHAL PARTICIPATION: A ROLE FOR THE IHO
Safe, hazard free transit in these economically strategic Straits is of
vital interest to the maritime community worldwide. As such, it should not be
the sole responsibility for the Straits states to bear the entire cost and
responsibility for policing pirates from these waterways themselves. Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad recently argued for a levy on all vessels
transiting the Straits of Malacca. 22 6 Such an extreme proposal would
likely be unachieveable both in the mechanics of its application and for the
inevitable international resistance to the undesirable precedent such a
measure would establish. However, some degree of participation and cost
sharing by all of the major maritime nations is warranted. 2 2 7 This is where
the IMO can play an important role.
The Organization is well suited to enlist international participation in the
form of maritime law enforcement training by states with modern coast guards
or marine police, the donation of surplus vessels and equipment suitable for
an anti-piracy mission, or perhaps even to directly administer a multi-
national maritime patrol force in these waters analogous to a U.N.
peacekeeping force. As its record on the Straits traffic separation scheme, as
well as a variety of other international maritime safety initiatives
demonstrates, the IMO is a highly respected international organization. Thus
it is especially well suited to the challenge of coordinating an anti-piracy
enforcement program which would respect the territorial sovereignty concerns
of the Straits states, yet ensure that a modern, efficient , enforcement
program, which met the needs of the international maritime community as a
whole, was carried out in the region.
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION
There is cause for guarded optimism in the fight against disruptions to the
international maritime order. The 1 March 1992 entry into force of the Rome
convention22 8 (along with the Protocol for offshore platforms) brings to
bear an important new weapon in the international community's legal arsenal
against maritime terrorism. Admittedly, it is a weapon more effective in its
reactive capacity to ensure the prosecution of modern "terrorist/pirates",
rather than in its preventative character to eliminate piratic attack in the
first place. Nonetheless, it marks an important step forward in international
community's recognition of the reality of maritime terrorism and the necessity
to provide an effective international legal mechanism with which to respond to
problems when they do occur.
Cautious optimism also prevails in the Straits region. After more than a
decade of denial, evasion, and inaction due to jurisdictional squabbling, it
now appears that the Straits states have finally acknowledged the gravity of
the piracy problem, and are at last willing to take some meaningful
enforcement action to eliminate it. 229 Unfortunately for the international
maritime community at large, the Straits states continue to exude a strong
regional parochialism wh-ich militates against what they perceive as "outside"
interference. A proposal to establish a regional anti-piracy center in the
Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur, financed by the international maritime
community, initially met with resistance from the Indonesians during a
regional anti-piracy conference held in Kuala Lumpur in July 1992 . 2 30
Indonesia later accepted the idea, and the center began operation in late
September 1992. 2 3 1 The center, set up by the London based International
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Maritime Bureau, functions as a 24 hour coordination center to answer distress
calls from ships. It will also collate information that could be used by law
enforcement personnel to locate and prosecute pirates. 23 2
While the nature and scope of piratic activity has evolved through the ages,
one common aspect has remained: the international character of the crime.
Whether it involves a cruise vessel of open registry with multinational crew
and passengers held hostage by terrorists on the high seas, or an oil tanker
registered under the flag of a traditional maritime nation, attacked by armed
pirates while transiting an international strait wholly within the territorial
waters of a single littoral state, compelling international interests are
involved. While the maritime industry's self help measures, i.e., increased
security awareness and preventative measures aboard ship, rerouting away from
geographic trouble spots where economically practicable, etc., are an
important part of an overall enforcement strategy, ultimately international
problems require international solutions. In ages past it may well have been
acceptable for the dominant maritime powers of the day to engage in repressive
unilateral enforcement action against pirates. However, the contemporary state
of international relations and the conventional notions of the law of the sea
are very unlikely to permit a modern Pompey the Great or Captain Keppel to be
unleashed against the maritime security threats facing the international
maritime community today.
Fortunately today, a more acceptable approach to achieving global maritime
security exists under the auspices of the rHO. The rHO has been looking into
the creation of a multi-national task force to outline the problem of piracy
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and armed robbery against ships in the Strait of Halacca. 2 3 3 The task
force would be established to specify navigational techniques to be used in
waterways prone to piracy, and recommend safety precautions and enforcement
arrangements for crews, ship owners and operators, and flag, coastal, and port
states. The U.S. Coast Guard has also indicated support for IHO sponsored
involvement in an anti-piracy program in this region. 2 3 4 Thus, should the
regional anti-piracy measures now being implemented by the Straits states fall
short of expectations, the IHO should not hesitate to bring to bear its
expertise to the situation.
In addition to these anti-piracy initiatives, it is strongly encouraged that
more of the world's largest shipowning nations and port states ratify the 1988
Rome Convention in order to demonstrate a united front against maritime
terrorism.
The maritime community's technological advances in response to nature's
challenges have provided, at best, a tenuous accommodation between the
vagaries of the ocean, and the mariner's desire for safety upon it. Thus the
seasoned mariner is quick to conce~e that nature always maintains the upper
hand. However, international cooperation in the development and
implementation of legal mechanisms against the challenges of piracy and
maritime terrorism will ensure that in the future, the mariner need not make
any such concession to the pirate.
100
1. United Nations, Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Montego Bay, 10 December 1982 (A/CONF.62/122), 7 October 1982.
2. United Nations Convention on the High Seas, Geneva, 29 April 1958, 450
United Nations Treaty Series 82.
3. The Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Rome, 10 March 1988 27 International Legal Materials
(1988): 668.
4. 2 Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome,
(1911):370, cited in Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, (Newport, RI: Naval War
College Press, 1988), p.3.
5. Bury, J.B., History of Greece, (London: McMillan, 1963), p.57; cited in
Boulton, J.W., "Maritime Order and the Development of the International Law of
Piracy," 7(5) International Relations (1983): 2339.
6. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1988),
p.5.
7. Peterson, M.J., "An Historical Perspective on the Incidence of Piracy," in
E. Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea, (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), p.46.
8. Boulton, J.W., "Maritime Order and the Development of the International Law
of Piracy," 7(5) International Relations (1983): 2339.
9. Ibid.
10. Peterson, M.J., "Historical Perspective," supra note 7, p.46.
11. 4 Blackstone Commentaries (1790): 71, cited in "Harvard Research Draft,"
26 American Journal of International Law, Supp. IV, (1932): 758.
12. Howell's State Trials, (xii. 1271-72), in Wheaton, H., Elements of
International Law (Dana, ed.) Sec. 124, footnote by Dana, cited in "Harvard
Research Draft," 26 American Journal of International Law, Supp. IV, (1932):
796.
13. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.10.
14. III Cicero, De Officiis 29, cited in Constantinople, G.R., "Towards a New
Definition of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident," 26(3) Virginia Journal of
International Law (1986): 725, note 4.
15. Boulton, J.W., "Maritime Order," supra note 8, p.2339.
16. e.g., see Birnie, P.W., "Piracy Past, Present and Future," in E. Ellen,
ed., Piracy at Sea, (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), p.131; also, Boulton, J.W.,
"Maritime Order," supra note 8.
101
17. Boulton, J.W., "Maritime Order," supra note 8, p. 2340.
18. Halberstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and
the IMO convention on Maritime Safety," 82 American Journal of International
Law (1988): 272.
19. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.20.
20. Gentili, A., De Jure Belli Libri Tres (1612), cited by Brittin, B.H., "The
Law of Piracy: Does it Meet the Present and Potential Challenges?," in E.
Ellen, ed.,Piracy at Sea (paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), p.159.
21. Birnie, P.W., "Piracy," supra note 16, p.132.
22. Boulton, J.W., "Maritime Order," supra note 8, p.2343.
23. Birnie. P.W., "Piracy," supra note 16, p.132.
24. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.30.
25. Grotius, H., De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book II, (Carnegie Endowment Classics
of International Law, 1925), ch. iii, para. 13(2).
26. Privateering was the legitimate practice of commissioning private vessels
in time of war to capture enemy vessels as war prizes. Privateering was
widespread in the early nineteenth century, and presented various problems to
the international maritime community, not the least of which was the great
number of commissioned privateers resulting from the various warring nation
states. The principal distinction between the pirate and the privateer was
that the latter had a commission issued by a legitimate recognized warring
sovereign, whereas the pirate had no such authority. Privateering was
outlawed at the end of the crimean war by the 1856 Treaty of Paris. See, C.J.
Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (London: Longmans Green & Co.,
1968), pp.481-482.
27. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.84.
28. Rex v. Dawson, 13 How. St. Tr. 451 (1696), pp.454-455, cited in Rubin,
A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p .85.
29. 28 Henry VIII c.15, 2 Statutes at Large (1763 ed.) 258, cited in Rubin,
A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, Appendix.
30. Early conceptions of the scope of English Admiralty jurisdiction against
pirates were broad indeed, as evidenced by this opinion of English Admiralty
judge David Lewes in 1579: ..... the first and principal part of the Lord
Admirall's office by law is, and ever hath been, to clear the jurisdiction
apperteyning to his office, being the sea, of pyrats and rovers haunting the
same . . . .. . 1 Marsden, Documents: 224, cited in Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy,
supra note 6, pp.43, 62.
31. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.86.
102
32. Molloy, C., De Jure Maritimo Book I (1677), ch. IV, para. xii, p.38, cited
in Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.87.
33. Wynne, W., Life of Sir Leoline Jenkins, Vol. I, (London: Downing, 1724),
p.86, cited in Rubin, A.P. The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.87.
34. see Rex v. Dawson supra note 28, p.92.
35. Bynkershoek, C., Questionum Juris PUblici, Vol. II (1737) p.98, cited in
Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.106.
36. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.108.
37. Lenoir, J.J., "Piracy Cases in the Supreme Court," 25 Journal of Criminal
Law and Criminology (1934-35): 534.
38. The Harvard Research Draft includes a comprehensive list of the applicable
piracy laws of the various national states at the time; see 26 American
Journal of International Law, Supp. IV (1932): 893.
39. Kennedy, Judge L., Bolivia v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Assurance Co.,
Limited, 1 K.B. 875 (1909), p.802 , cited in "Harvard Research Draft," infra
note 40, p.750.
40. Harvard Research in International Law, "Draft Convention on Piracy with
Comments" (hereinafter "Harvard Research Draft"), 26 American Journal of
International Law Supplement IV (1932): 749.
41. Lenoir, J.J., "Supreme Court," supra note 37, p.535.
42. "Harvard Research Draft," supra note 40, p.754.
43. Whatley, A., "Historical Sketch of the Law of Piracy," 3 Law Maaazine and
Review (1874): 630, cited in Boulton, J.W., "The Modern International Law of
Piracy: Content and Contemporary Relevance," 7(6) International Relations
(1983): 2496.
44. 1 Kent, Commentaries on American Law (1826), Lecture IX, pp. 169-179,
cited in Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.153.
45. Lorimer, J., The Institutes of Law, Vol. II (1872), p.132, cited in
"Harvard Research Draft," supra note 40, p.753.
46. Clingan, T.A., "The Law of Piracy," in E. Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea
(Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), p.168.
47. Lenoir, J.J., "Supreme Court," supra note 37, p.535.
48. Boulton, J.W., "The Modern International Law of Piracy: Content and
Contemporary Relevance," 7(6) International Relations (1983): 2052.
103
49. conBtantinople, G., "TowardB a New Definition of Piracy: the Achille Lauro
Incident," 26(3) virginia Journal of International Law (1986): 727.
50. Fairman, C., "A Note on Re Piracy Jure Gentium," 29 American Journal of
International Law (1935): 508.
51. Lenoir, J.J., "Supreme Court," Bupra note 37, p.536.
52. Constantinople. G., "New Definition of Piracy," Bupra note 49, p .728.
53. 4 BlackBtone CommentarieB (1769, 1790): 71-73, cited in "Harvard Research
Draft," Bupra note 40, p.750.
54. Barratry iB any fraudulent or criminal conduct againBt an owner of a Bhip or
the ah Lp ' B cargo or goodB by the master or mar inerB in breach of the truBt
repoBed in them, and to the injury of the owner. See s aundexa , A., Maritime Law,
Second Edition (London: Effingham WilBon, 1920), p.333.
55. Mutiny iB any action by memberB of a Bhip'B crew which BolicitB, incites,
or BtirB up any other of the crew to diBobey or reBiBt the lawful orderB of
the officerB, or to refuBe or neglect their proper duty on board. See
RobinBon, G.H., Handbook of Admiralty Law (St. Paul, MN: WeBt Publishing Co.,
1939), p.342.
56. Ibid.
57. e.g., see Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, Bupra note 6, pp.220-232.
58. Serhassan (PirateB) 166 Eng. Rep 788 (1853).
59. Whiteman, M., Digest of International Law, Vol. 11, (WaBhington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p.143.
60. The Magellan PirateB, 164 Eng. Rep. 47 (1853), at p.48.
61. e.g., see crockett, C.H., "Toward a ReviBion of the International law of
Piracy," 26 DePaul Law Review (1976): 78.
62. The Magellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. 47 (1853), at p.48.
63. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, Bupra note 6, p.236.
64. Sir H. Lauterpacht, ed., L. oppenheim, International Law, Volume I
(1937), p.322, cited in Schwarzenberger, G., "The Problem of an International
Criminal Law," 3 Current Legal ProblemB (1950): 275.




67. In Re Piracy Jure Gentium, 49 Lloyd's List L.R. 411 (1934).
68. Id., pp.415-419.
69. Id., p.417.
70. 1st Congo 2nd Session, 1 Stat 112, (30 April 1790).




75. Id. , p.359.
76. Id. , p.360.
77. Id. , p.364.
78. Id. , p.364.
79. U.S. v. Klintock, 5 Wheaton's Reports 144, 18 US 614 (1820) .
80. Id., p.616.
81. Id., pp.617-618.
82. 15th Congo 2nd Sess., ch.77, 3 Stat. 510 (1850 ed.).
83. Id.





89. Lenoir, J.J., " Sup r e me Court," supra note 37, pp.541-542.
90. U.S. v. Smith at 5 Wheat.181.
91. U.S. V. Griffen and Brailsford, 18 US 184 (1820).
105
92. The Court also ruled that the Piracy Act of 1819 did not repeal Section 8
of the Crimes Act of 1790; U.S. v. Griffen and Brailsford,S Wheat. 184
(1820) .
93. U.S. v. Holmes, 18 US 412 (1820).
94. Id., p. 412.
95. U.S. v. Pirates, 18 US 623 (1820).
96. The Marianna Flora, 24 US 1 (1826).
97. The Palmyra, 25 US 1 (1827).
98. Id., pp.16-17.
99. Rubin, A.P., The Law Of Piracy, supra note 6, p.170.
100. U.S. v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 US 210 (1844).
101. Id., p. 232.
102. Id.
103. U.S. v. the Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. 408, Southern District N.Y., (1885).
104. Id., p.412.
105. People v . Lol-Lo and Saraw, 43 Philippine Islands 19 (1922), as reported
in 1 Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases (1919-1922): 164-165,
Case No. 112.
106. Id., cf. US v. Wiltberger, 18 US 76 (1820), where Justice Marshall
overturned a piracy conviction resulting from a murder which occurred on an
American vessel in the territorial waters of China on the grounds that the
legislative purpose of the statutory definition of piracy provided in Section
8 of the Act of 1790 was not to assert jurisdiction over everybody any place,
but only in specific places, i.e., the high sea and rivers, havens, basins or
bays outside the jurisdictfon of any state; the offense thus committed within
Chinese territorial waters was within the jurisdiction of China, thereby
voiding application of Section 8.
107. Aune, B., "Piracy and Its Repression Under the 1982 Law of the Sea
convention," in Ocean Yearbook 8, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1989), p.19.
108. e.g., see Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, pp.295-298.
109. 20 American Journal of International Law Special Supplement 2-3 (1926) :
228-229 .
110. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.306.
106
Ill. 20 American Journal of International Law Special supplement 2-3 (1926):
228-229.
112. At least one jurist at the time saw the Draft as a precursor to the
development of an international tribunal of justice before which private
individuals might be prosecuted for crimes against the international
community. M. Pella, a Roumanian, in reply to a questionnaire propounded by
the League of Nations Committee of Experts observed:
"Absolute piracy [piracy jure gentium] is regarded today as an
offense of special character, because it is punishable wherever
encountered. We already see here in embryo the principle-which,
in future social relations will become the practice-of penalizing
throughout the world violations of laws which are common to every
country .•• lf we can evolve with reference to the suppression of
piracy, a new combination of the principles of penal law with
those of international law, we shall be able to bring to light
hitherto unsuspected aspects of this question which render an
international convention indispensable."
Cited in "Harvard Research Draft," supra note 40, p.7S7.
113. Treaty Relating to the Use of Submarines and Noxious GaseS in wartime,
Washington, 6 February 1922, 16 American Journal of International Law
Supplement (1922): 57.
114. Ibid.
115. International Agreement for Collective Measures against Piratical Attacks
in the Mediterranean by Submarines, 14 September 1937, 38 United Kingdom
Treaty Series (1937).
116. Ibid.
117. Convention on Duties and Riahts of States in the Event of Civil Strife,
Havana, 20 Feb 1928, listed in Schindler, D. & J. Toman, The Laws of Armed
Conflicts (1981), p.80S, cited in Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note
6, p.418.
118. Birnie, P.w., "Piracy," supra note 16, p.137.
119. Sundberg, J.W.F., "Piracy: Air and Sea," 20 De Paul Law Review (1971):
399.
120. Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, supra note 6, p.298.
121. 26 American Journal of International Law Supp. IV (1932): 768.
122. Clingan, T.A., "The Law of Piracy," supra note 46, p.169.




126. Steil, P., Der Tatbestand der Piraterie ..• , (Leipzig: Berucksichtigung
der Landesgesetzgebungen, 1903), cited in Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy,
supra note 6, p.311.
127. steil, P., Piraterie, cited in "Harvard Research Draft," supra note 40,
p.761.
128. "Harvard Research Draft," supra note 40, p.763.
129. "Harvard Research Draft," supra note 40, p.769.
130. e.g., see Constantinople, G., "New Definition of Piracy," supra note 49;
Halberstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas," supra note 18.
131. Dubner, S.H., The Law of International Sea Piracy, (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1980), p.103.
132. "Harvard Research Draft," supra note 40, p.809.
133. United Nations, Regime of the High Seas, 1 March 1954, (A/CN.4/79) cited
in, 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1954): 7.
134. United Nations, Observations of the Government of Poland, concerning
freedom of navigation on the high seas, transmitted by Mr. Jan Balicki,
observer of Poland to the Seventh Session of the International Law Commission,
6 May 1955, (A/CN.4/L.53), cited in 2 Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (1955): 1.
135. Ibid.
136. The subject of nationalist Chinese vessels intercepting other nations'
merchantmen enroute to mainland China had previously been addressed by the UN,
and attempts to label the Nationalists actions as piratical had been rejected
in December 1954 by the Ad Hoc Political Committee. See Rubin, A.P., The Law
of Piracy, supra note 6, p.320.
137. Dubner, S.H., International Sea Piracy, supra note 131, p.108.
138. 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1955): 53.
139. 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1955): 55-57.
140. United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission concerning the
work of its Seventh Session, 2 May-8 July 1955, (A/2934). cited in 2 Yearbook




143. United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, Seventh Session Comment to Article 14, (A/2934), cited in 2 Yearbook





148. United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, concerning the work of its Eighth Session, 27 April-4 July 1956,
(A/3159), cited in 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1956): 253-
303 .
149. United Nations, Summary of Records of the Eighth Session, 343rd Meeting,
9 May 1956, (A/Cn.4/SR), cited in 1 Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (1956): 46-48.
150. Ibid.
151. United Nations, Summary of Replies from Governments and Conclusions of
the Special Rapporteur, (A/CN.4/99/Add.1), cited in 2 Yearbook of the
International Law Commission (1956): 18-20.
152. Ibid., pp.46-48 .
153. United Nations, Summary of Records of the Eighth Session, 343rd meeting,
9 May 1956, (A/CN.4/SR), cited in 1 Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (1956): 48.
154. see note 189, infra.
155. United Nations, Summary of Replies from Governments and Conclusions of
Special Rapporteur, (A/CN.4/99/Add.1), cited in 2 Yearbook of the
International Law Commission (1956): 18-20.
156 . United Nations, Summary of Records of the Eighth Session, 343rd meeting,
9 May 1956, (A/CN.4/SR), cited in 1 Yearbook of the International Law
Commission (1956): 46-48.
157. United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly concerning the work of its Eighth Session, 27 April-4 July 1956,
(A/3159), cited in 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1956): 283.
158. United Nations, Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly concerning the work of its Seventh Session, 2 May-8 Julv 1955,
(A/2934), cited in 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1955): 26-
109
27.
159. For an excellent account of this incident see Joyner, N.D., "Aerial
Hijacking as an International Crime," Oceana (1974): 106-113; one of the most
comprehensive accumulations of citations regarding this incident is found in
Menefee, S.P., "Terrorism at Sea: The Historical Development of an
International Response," notes 59-106, in E. Ellen, ed.,Violence at Sea
(Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), p.191.
160. Ha1berstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas," supra note 18, p.286.
161. Fenwick, C.G., "Piracy" in the Caribbean," 55 American Journal of
International Law (1961): 426-428.
162. Green, L.C., "The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates?," 37 British Yearbook
of International Law (1961): 496.
163. Ibid., p.503.
164. Brittin, B.H., "The Law of Piracy: Does it meet the Present and Potential
Challenges?," in E. Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989),
p.163.
165. Joyner, N.D., "Aerial Hijacking," supra note 159, p.119.
166. For a concise synopsis of the seizure see Constantinople, G., "New
Definition of Piracy," supra note 49, pp.745-747.
167. Pursuant to PL 99-399 of 26 August 1986, the US enacted "The Omnibus
Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986" (18 USCA 2332) which
established extraterritorial jurisdiction over terrorist acts abroad against
US nationals, and "The International Maritime and Port Security Act of 1986"
which, inter alia, directed the Secretary of Transportation to develop and
implement a plan to assess the effectiveness of the security measures
maintained at those foreign ports which pose a high risk of terrorism against
vessel passengers.
168. 24 International Legal Materials (1985): 1556-57.
169. United Nations, Summary of Records of the Seventh Session, discussion of
comment to Article 14, (A/CN.4/Ser.A/1955), cited in 1 Yearbook of the
International Law Commission (1955): 266-67.
170. Ibid.
171. Halberstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas," supra note 18, p.290.
172. Constantinople, G., "New Definition of piracy," supra note 49, p.749.
173. For a discussion of the scope of maritime terrorism see Menefee, S.P.,
"Maritime Terror in Europe and the Mediterranean," Marine policy (April 1988):
143.
110
174. Consider the Explanatory note to the first draft of the Convention
provided by Austria, Egypt and Italy:
"The acts that at any moment may be committed against the safety
of maritime navigation are indeed only touched upon by the
reference to "acts of piracy" under art. 15 of the 1958 Convention
on the High Seas and the corresponding art. 101 of the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea. These provisions apply to
illegal acts of violence or detention or any other act of
depredation committed for private ends by the crew or the
passengers of a private ship on the high seas against another ship
or against persons on board of such a ship. Thus, these acts cover
only a small part of the unlawful acts that deserve punishment as
such acts are mostly not committed for private ends or from aboard
a ship against persons on board of another ship." (IMO Doc.
C/57/25 p.4)
Cited in Treves, T., "The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation," note 13, in N. Ronzitti, ed.,
Maritime Terrorism and International Law, (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1990), p.87.
175. United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 40/61 of 9 December 1985
(paragraph 13), cited in 80 American Journal of International Law (1986): 437.
It should also be noted that pursuant to IMO Assembly resolution A.584(14)
of 20 November 1985, the IMO directed that internationally agreed measures
should be developed, on a priority basis, by the Maritime Safety Committee to
ensure the security of passengers and crews on board ships and authorized the
Maritime Safety Committee to request the Secretary General to issue a circular
containing information on the agreed measures to governments, organizations,
concerned and interested parties for their consideration and adoption. At its
fifty third session the Maritime Safety Committee approved the measures to
prevent unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships, and
published same as MSC/Circ.443 of 26 September 1986, entitled "Measures to
Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers and Crews on Board Ships."
176. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at
The Hague, 16 Dec 1970, 860 UNTS 105; The Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal 23 Sept.
1971, 974 UNTS 177 (completed by a Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, made at
Montreal, 24 Feb 1988; 27 International Legal Materials (1988): 628.
177. The International Convention Aaainst the Taking of Hostaaes done at New
York, 18 Dec. 1979 to 31 Dec. 1980, 81 United Kingdom Treaty Series (1983): 5.
178. The UNGA Resolution was dated December 1985, the Convention was opened
for signature on 1 March 1988, and when France became the 15th country to
deposit its instrument of ratification on 2 December 1991, the Convention
entered into force on 1 March 1992.
111
179. Plant, G., "The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation," 39 International and Comparative Law
Quarterly (1990): 31.
180. Halberstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas," supra note 18, p.291.
181. Plant, G., "Convention," supra note 179, p.31.
182. 27 International Legal Materials (1988): 668.
183. Treves, T., "Rome Convention," supra note 174, p.70.
184. Ibid., pp .71-72.
185. cf., The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 14 Dec 1973,
28 UST 1975, TIAS no. 8532, which makes killing an offense.
186. Halberstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas," supra note 18, p.295.
187. Plant, G., "Convention," supra note 179, p.42.
188. Ha1berstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas," supra note 18, p.294.
189. Birnie, P .W., "Piracy, Past, Present and Future," in E. Ellen, ed.,
Piracy at Sea (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), p.141.
190. Ibid., p.140.
191. Though international straits are by conventional definition (1982 Law of
the Sea convention, Part III, Straits used for International Navigation,
Articles 34-45) territorial waters of one or more states, a ship navigating in
international straits, if its schedule included navigation beyond the outer or
lateral limits of the territorial sea, would be covered by in the Rome
Convention.
192. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Final Act, Paragraph 23., 27 International Legal
Materials (1988): 668.
193. United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for
signature 23 May 1969, (A/CONF.39/27) , 63 American Journal of International
Law (1969): 885. Article 32 reads:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation,
including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances
of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from
the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when
the interpretation according to Article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
112
194. Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 4th Edition
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), p.304.
195. Ibid., p.303.
196. Halberstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas," supra note 18, p.302.
197. "Defense Chief Discusses Sea Piracy Data", The Straits Times (Singapore)
13 August 1992, p.23.
198. Leifer, M., International Straits of the World: Ma1acca, Singapore, and
Indonesia, (The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978), p.52.
199. Fairplay, (18 June 1992): 23; in 1991 the Port of Singapore handled 6.35
million containers.
200. Whisenhut, CAPT M., "Piracy and the Threat to USTRANSCOM," Defense
Transportation Journal (August 1990): 16.
201. IMCO Assembly Resolution on Navigation through the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore, 14 November 1977; ' for an excellent account of the history and
politics behind the development of this traffic separation scheme, see Leifer,
International Straits, supra note 198, pp.62-76.
202. See generally: "Please Repel our Boarders," Far Eastern Economic Review
(9 October 1981): 43; "Piracy: An Ancient Menace Makes a 20th Century
Comeback," The Professional Mariner (August 1985): 5; Villar, R., Piracy
Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea Since 1980, (New York: Conway Maritime
Press: 1985), chap. 3; "IMB Chronology of Pirate Attacks on Merchant Vessels,"
in E. Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea, (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), Appendix;
Dzurek, D.J., "Piracy in Southeast Asia," 32(4) Oceanus (Winter89/90): 66;
"Raiders of Riau, Alarming Surge in Attacks on Shipping," Far East Economic
Review (2 July 1992): 14; "Fewer Pirate Attacks After Joint Patrols and More
Indonesian Action," The Straits Times (Singapore), 3 September 1992.
203. Partridge, E., "The History of Pirates," 26 Ouarterly Review (1934): 142.
204. Oil tankers have not been the only targets however. e.g. "Australian
Boxships Raided Off of Singapore," Journal of Commerce, 10 October 1990.
205. "Pirates Take $6000 From Safe of Tanker off Indonesian Coast", Journal of
Commerce, 28 March 1991.
206. "Danger at Sea Near the Singapore Strait," District 2 MEBA-AME Newsletter,
(September 1991).
207. ASEAN Diary 1991, (Singapore: Times Editions Pte. Ltd., 1991), p.23.
208. Ibid., p.13.
209. "Raiders of Riau: Alarming Surge in Attacks on Shipping," Far Eastern
Economic Review (2 July 1992): 15.
113
210. Recent speculation by Malaysian and Singaporean shipowners suggests that
much of the piratic activity is being committed by corrupt Indonesian Customs
officials. "It is a well known fact in Singapore's shipping circles that the
attacks were well organized and committed by a small group of poorly paid
Indonesian customs officers trying to make ends meet," see Fairplay, (18 June
1992): 23, and also, "The Batam Connection," Far Eastern Economic Review (2
July 1992): 15.
211. Article 100, 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.
212. I.C. Reports (1949): 4; see also 43 American Journal of International Law
(1949): 558, and 44 American Journal of International Law (1950): 579, for
arguments on the merits, and assessment of compensation, respectively.
213. cited in Schwarzenberger, G., "The Problem of an International Criminal
Law," 3 Current Legal Problems (1950): 278.
214. Ibid., p.278.
215. Ibid., p.279.
216. Johnson, D.H.N., "Piracy in Modern International Law," 43 Transactions of
the Grotius Society (1957): 65.
217. Terazaki, N.H., "The UNCTAD Perspective on Piracy," in E. Ellen, ed.,
Piracy at Sea (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), pp.173-179.
218. "Joint Statement of the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Singapore, 16 November 1971," see Leifer, M., International Straits, supra
note 198, p.204.
219. Ibid., p. 65.
220. Ibid., pp.75-76.
221. e.g., see "Pirate Attacks Raise Fear of Disaster," The Straits Times
(Singapore), 9 July 1992; "Raiders of Riau," Far East Economic Review (2 July
1992): 15; "No Reports of Piracy with new Joint Patrols," The Singapore
Shipping Times, 26 August i992.
222. "Minister on France-Japan Plutonium Shipment," Jakarta: Radio Republik
Indonesia (31 August 1992), cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
East Asia (FBIS-EAS 92-171), 2 September 1992; see also: "Japan's Quiet Plan
to Import Plutonium Brings a Shudder of Nuclear Anxiety," New York Times, 25
November 1991, p.D8:1; "Danger Ship," The New Paper (Singapore), 22 september
1992, p.17; "Japan's Plan to Ship Plutonium Has Big and Little Lands Roaring,"
The New York Times, 5 October 1992, p.1.
223. e.g. see: Fairplay (18 June 1992): 23; "HK Shipowners Hit Out at ASEAN,"
The Singapore Shipping Times, 30 July 1992; "Fight Pirates on Land and Sea
Shipowners Urge," The Singapore Shipping Times, 3 August 1992.
114
224. "Defence Chief Discusses Sea Piracy Data," The straits Times (Singapore),
13 August 1992, p.23; "Singapore, Indonesia Join Forces to Combat Rash of
Pirate Raids," The Journal of Commerce, 3 August 1992; "Singapore, Indonesia
Team up to Fight Piracy," Bangkok Post, 31 July 1992, p.10; "Right of Hot
Pursuit Will Make Piracy Patrols More Effective," The Straits Times
(Singapore), 13 August 1992.
225. "Joint Maritime Patrols with Malaysia set for September," Jakarta: Radio
Republik Indonesia, cited in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Asia,
(FBIS-EAS 92-155), 11 August 1992; "Joint Maritime Committee Set up with
Indonesia," Kuala Lumpur: Voice of Malaysia, cited in Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, East Asia, (FBIS-EAS 92-149), 3 August 1992.
226. "ASEAN Levy to Combat Piracy, Pollution Criticised," The Singapore
Shipping Times, 5 August 1992; "Shipowners Say Levy Isn't Answer to Malaysia's
Safety Problems," Journal of Commerce, 9 september 1992, p.B:1B.
227. There already exists precedent for international cost sharing. A
consortium of Japanese shipping and petroleum interests established, with
government support in July 1968, the Malacca Strait Council. The purpose of
the Council was to promote the improvement of navigational aids in the Straits
to enhance the safety of navigation. Between 1969 and 1974 the Council donated
8 lighted buoys, 3 lighthouses, and 6 lighted beacons to the government of
Indonesia. The Indonesians were tasked with operating and maintaining them,
but spare parts, facility repairs, and buoy repositioning have been financed
by the Council. see Leifer, M., International Straits, supra note 198,
pp.40,49,57,58.
228 . Parties to the Convention include: Austria, China, France, The Gambia,
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Oman, Norway, Poland, Seychelles, Spain, Sweden,
Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Kingdom; all of these countries except The
Gambia have accepted the Protocol.
At the present time (October 1992) the United States Senate has given its
advice and consent to the Convention, however the necessary implementing
legislation, proposed originally in the Senate Judiciary Committee's Omnibus
Crime Bill, is now being held up in Conference Committee, and will not likely
be enacted this term, author's telephone conversation with Mr. Mike Kraft,
U.S. Department of State, Office of Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C., 2
October 1992.
229. Rajasingam, M., "Piracy in the Far East Region," 37(5) Ports and Harbors
(June 1992): 17.
230. "Singapore, Indonesia Team up to Fight Piracy," Bangkok Post, 31 July
1992, p.10.
231. "Maritime Bureau Opens Center to Fight Piracy in Southeast Asia," Journal
of Commerce, 2 October 1992, p.B:1B.
232. Ibid.
115
233. W.A. O'Neil, Secretary General, IMO, telefax letter, reference no.89l7 of
12 November 1992, to ADM J.W. Kime, Commandant u.s. Coast Guard, re subject of
piracy in the Strait of Malacca.
234. ADM J.W. Kime, Commandant USCG, letter 16600 of 23 October 1992, to Mr.
William O'Neil, Secretary General, IMO, re piracy in the Strait of Malacca.
116





















" , :... . ,"
....
. ..... '. ," -. HrJ
-.Klan g'.
. . .' .. .' .. . ..:.. : .... .:.:. ':':. .' .:....::.:...:.:.:..::
. ,': '
' .. , ' , , " . " , : : :::.: '.::.;"': .
:::::::' : <>:: .
119
THE SINGARORE STRAIT










SINGAPORE AND RIAU ARCHIPELAGO
(micro view)
P lp
MAP 3 I SINGAPORE AND RIAU ARCHIPELAGO
( MACRO-Vln )
Bl71 GEIW.D S. GlWWl , GBE4T BRI'UIJ II 'mI DlDU!l OCUI,
OUORD: CLAlIIrlIlON PRESS. 1967, P. J30.
121
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brownlie, I., principles of Public International Law, 4th Edition, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990).
Dubner, B.H., The Law of International Sea piracy, (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1980).
Ellen, E., (ed.), Piracy at Sea, (Paris: ICC PUblishing, 1989).
Grotius, H., De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Book II, (Carnegie Endowment Classics of
International Law, 1925).
Leifer, M., International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore and
Indonesia, (The Netherlands: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1978).
Mcphee, J., Looking for a Ship, (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1990).
Murray, D.M., Pirates of the South China Coast 1790-1810, (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1987).
Parritt, B.A.H., (ed.), Violence at Sea, (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1987).
Robinson, G.H., Handbook of Admiralty Law, (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.,
1939) .
Ronzitti, N., (ed.), Maritime Terrorism and International Law, (The
Netherlands: K1uwer Academic Publishers, 1990).
Rubin, A.P., The Law of Piracy, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1988).
Saunders, A., Maritime Law, Second Edition, (London: Effingham Wilson, 1920).
Villar, R., Piracy Today: Robbery and Violence at Sea Since 1980, (London:
Conway Maritime Press, 1985).
Whiteman, M., Digest of International Law, Vol. 11,
Government Printing Office, 1968).
ARTICLES
(Washington, D.C.: u.S.
Aune, B., "Piracy and Its Repression Under the 1982 Law of the Sea
convention," in Ocean Yearbook 8, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1989), pp.18-43.
Birnie, P.w., "piracy: Past, Present, and Future," in E. Ellen, ed.,piracy at
Sea, (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), pp.131-157.
Boulton, J.W., "Maritime Order and the Development of the International Law of
Piracy," 7(5) International Relations (1983): 2335-2350.
122
"The Modern International Law of Piracy: Content and
Contemporary Relevance," 7(6) International Relations (1983): 2493-2511.
Brittin, B.H., "The Law of piracy: Does it Meet the Present and Potential
Challenges?," in E. Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea, (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989),
pp.l59-167.
Clingan, T.A., "The Law of Piracy," in E. Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea (Paris:
ICC Publishing, 1989), pp.168-172.
Constantinople, G., "Towards a New Definition of Piracy: the Achille Lauro
Incident," 26(3) Virginia Journal of International Law (1986): 723-753.
Crockett, C.H., "Toward a Revision of the International Law of Piracy," 26 De
Paul Law Review (1976): 78-99.
Dzurek, D.J., "Piracy in Southeast Asia," 32(4) Oceanus (Winter 89/90): 66-70.
Fairman, C., "A Note on Re Piracy Jure Gentium," 29 American Journal of
International Law (1935): 508-512.
Fenwick, C.G., "Piracy" in the Caribbean," 55 American Journal of
International Law (1961): 426-428.
Green, L.C., "The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates?," 37 British Yearbook of
International Law (1961): 496.
Halberstam, M., "Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the
IMO Convention on Maritime Safety," 82 American Journal of International Law
(1988): 269-310.
Harvard Research in International Law, "Draft Convention on Piracy with
Comments," 26 American Journal of International Law Supplement IV (1932): 749-
1002.
Johnson, D.H.N., "Piracy in Modern International Law," 43 Transactions of the
Grotius Society (1957): 63-85.
Joyner, N.D., "A Contemporary Concept of Piracy in International Law: The
Status of Aerial Hijacking as an International Crime," Oceana (1974): 106-113.
Lenoir, J.J., "Piracy Cases in the Supreme Court," 25 Journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology (1934-35): 532-553.
Menefee, S.P., "Terrorism at Sea: The Historical Development of an
International Response," in B. Parritt, ed., Violence at Sea (Paris: ICC
Publishing, 1987), pp.191-220.
"Maritime Terror in Europe and the Mediterranean," Marine
Policy (April 1988):143-151.
O'Hara, T.J., "Piracy: An Ancient Menace Makes a 20th Century Comeback," The
Professional Mariner (August 1985): 4-6.
123
Partridge, E., "The History of Pirates," 26 Quarterly Review (1934): 142-153.
Peterson, M.J., "An Historical Perspective on the Incidence of Piracy," in E.
Ellen, ed., Piracy at Sea, (paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), pp.41-60.
Plant, G., "The Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation," 39 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
(1990): 27-56.
Rajasingam, M., "Piracy in the Far East Region," 37(5) Ports and Harbors (June
1992): 17-18.
Schwarzenberger, G., "The Problem of an International Criminal Law," 3 Current
Legal Problems (1950): 263-269.
Sundberg, J.F.W., "Piracy: Air and Sea," 20 De Paul Law Review (1971): 337-
435.
Terazaki, N.H., "The UNCTAD Perspective on Piracy," in E. Ellen, ed., Piracy
at Sea (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), pp.173-178.
Treves, T., "The Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against
the Safety of Maritime Navigation," in N. Ronzitti, ed., Maritime Terrorism
and International Law (The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990),
pp.74-88.
Whisenhut, M., "Piracy and the Threat to USTRANSCOM," Defense Transportation
Journal (August 1990): 16-18.
NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, AND BROADCASTS
Bangkok Post, 31 July 1992.
District 2 MEBA-AME Newsletter, September 1991.
Fairplay, 18 June 1992.
Far East Economic Review, 9 October 1981; 2 July 1992.
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, East Asia, 3, 11 August, 2 September
1992.
The Journal of Commerce, 10 October 1990; 28 March 1991; 3 August, 9
September, 2 October 1992.
The New Paper (Singapore), 22 September 1992.
The New York Times, 25 November 1991, 5 October 1992.
Singapore Shipping Times, 30 July, 3, 5, 26 August 1992.
The Straits Times (Singapore), 9 July, 13 August, 3 September 1992.
124
OTHER MATERIAL
ASEAN Diary 1991, (Singapore: Times Editions Pte. Ltd., 1991).
United Nations, Summary of Records of the Sixth Session, 3 June-28 July 1954
(A/CN.4/Ser . A./1954), cited in 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission
(1954).
United Nations, Documents of the Sixth Session Including the Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly (A/CN.4/Ser.
A./F.34/Add.1), cited in 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission
(1954).
United Nations, Summary of Records of the Seventh Session, 2 May-8 July 1955
(A/CN.4/ser. A./1955), cited in 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission
(1955).
United Nations, Documents of the Seventh Session Including the Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly (A/CN.4/ Ser.A./
1955/Add.l), cited in 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1955).
United Nations, Summary of Records of the Eighth Session, 27 Aoril-4 Julv 1956
(A/CN.4/Ser. A./1956), cited in 1 Yearbook of the International Law Commission
(1956).
United Nations, Documents of the Eighth Session Including the Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly (A/CN.4/ Sere A./
1956/Add.1), cited in 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1956).
125
